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FISCAL DISCIPLINE is currently  the main macroeconomic  problem  faced 
by industrial  and developing countries. Following the fiscal profligacy 
of the 1970s and early 1980s, deficit reduction  has dominated  the po- 
litical economy debate during the past few years. The United States, 
after experiencing mounting deficits in the early and mid-1980s, has 
recently achieved a balanced  budget. In Latin America, several coun- 
tries show a marked  improvement  in their budget balances since the 
"lost decade" of the 1980s, although it remains to be seen how per- 
manent  these adjustments  are.' In Europe, inflation  is stable and low, 
and most countries  joining the European  Monetary  Union (EMU) have 
easily satisfied  the convergence  criterion  on inflation,  but achieving  the 
fiscal targets  has proved  a more  difficult  task.2  Deficit reduction  policies 
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are almost always associated with politically charged issues, such as 
the retrenchment  of overextended  welfare  states, the reform  of insolvent 
public pension systems, and the trimming  of large and inefficient bur- 
eaucracies. 
The textbook  view, embraced  by most policymakers,  is that  to reduce 
budget deficits is contractionary,  at least in the short run. Since a 
recession is a major  electoral liability, governments  hesitate to pursue 
fiscal adjustments.  However, recent  research  casts doubt  on this seem- 
ingly unquestionable  "stylized fact."3 Is it accurate,  then, to say that 
fiscal adjustments  are a political liability? 
In this paper  we reexamine  the research  on the economic effects of 
fiscal adjustments. Not all fiscal consolidations are contractionary: 
some are and some are not. In particular,  we emphasize that the com- 
position of the adjustment  matters. We confirm and extend evidence 
that fiscal corrections  relying mostly on spending  cuts that are concen- 
trated on government wages and transfers tend to be expansionary, 
whereas those relying mainly on tax increases are contractionary. 
The second and main purpose  of the paper  is to investigate whether 
governments that follow tight fiscal policies tend to be replaced in 
office,  or more generally, whether they lose popularity as they cut 
deficits. The answer to both questions is a loud no. Using data drawn 
from a sample of nineteen countries in the Organisation  for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), we find no evidence of  a 
systematic electoral penalty or fall in popularity  for governments  that 
follow restrained  fiscal policies. If anything, the opposite is the case: 
when deficits are reduced, governments  that follow a "cold turkey" 
approach  and focus on spending cuts may be rewarded  at the ballot 
box. Moreover, cabinets that are willing to cut transfers  and the gov- 
ernment  wage bill-traditionally  considered the two most politically 
charged  components  of spending-are  not punished  by the voters. 
Specifically, our results on the politics of fiscal adjustments  can be 
summarized  as follows. First, a coalition  government  is much  less likely 
to succeed in consolidating  the budget  than  a single party  government. 
Second, there is no evidence that looser fiscal policy implies longer 
political tenure. Third, in a period of fiscal adjustment,  a government 
3.  In particular, see Giavazzi and Pagano (1990); Perotti (1997); Alesina and 
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that relies on spending cuts may survive longer. Fourth, cuts in the 
government  wage bill and in transfers  do not increase the probability 
that the government  will collapse. And fifth, the popularity  of a gov- 
ernment  does not fall in the immediate  aftermath  of fiscal adjustments. 
One can think of two reasons why a cabinet that reduces a budget 
deficit might  not be punished  at the ballot box or in opinion  polls: either 
the voters are fiscally prudent  themselves and approve of tight fiscal 
policies, or fiscally prudent  governments  choose the appropriate  mo- 
ment to implement  unpopular  policies-when  they know that they can 
''get away" with it. In trying to disentangle these issues, we provide 
evidence in favor of the first interpretation. 
We are not aware  of any previous  paper  that  systematically  examines 
the effects of fiscal policy on the popularity  and  survival  of governments 
in a large sample of OECD  countries, but the issue has been addressed 
in other  contexts. In particular,  our results are consistent  with those of 
Sam Peltzman, who finds that American  voters behave as fiscal con- 
servatives  in state gubernatorial  elections and do not reward  governors 
who increase  spending.4  In a study of political business cycles in Latin 
American  countries, Moritz Kraemer  provides evidence that voters do 
not reward  cabinets that  pursue  loose fiscal policies and concludes that 
"higher deficits before elections do not seem to contribute  to victory at 
the ballot box."'5 
We start by discussing the evidence and the underlying  theory for 
the economic effects of fiscal adjustments.  In particular,  we focus on 
issues of composition. We then consider  whether  various  types of gov- 
ernment  are more  or less likely to succeed in fiscal adjustment.  We also 
examine  whether  governments  that  engage in fiscal adjustments  are  less 
likely to survive and look at the effect of a fiscal adjustment  on popu- 
larity ratings. Finally, we tackle the question of causality. 
The Evidence 
Before analyzing the political economy of fiscal consolidations, we 
discuss what is known about  their economics. In some sense, studying 
4.  Peltzman (1992). More recently, see Lowry, Alt, and Ferre (1997), who also 
provide  an excellent survey of the earlier  literature. 
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the economics of fiscal consolidations implies studying the effects of 
fiscal policy in general. Within  this very wide topic, we focus on large 
episodes of fiscal consolidation. We start  by pointing out some inter- 
esting empirical  regularities  in the data, which, although  in the nature 
of simple correlations, we find highly suggestive. We then take into 
account initial conditions and accompanying  policies, so as to partial 
out some concomitant  factors. Although the empirical  regularities  ap- 
pear to be very robust, their causal interpretation  is an open issue. We 
cannot categorically decide among several contrasting  interpretations; 
nevertheless, we do provide a coherent  explanation  for these results in 
the next section. 
Empirical  work  on the effects and  sustainability  of fiscal adjustments 
has consistently reached two conclusions.6 First, long-lasting adjust- 
ments rely mostly (or exclusively) on spending cuts, in particular,  in 
government  wages and social security and welfare; by contrast, short- 
lived adjustments  rely mostly on revenue increases. Second, fiscal ad- 
justments are not always associated with reduced growth, or with a 
deterioration  in the macroeconomic  environment  in general. 
We illustrate  these results  by isolating episodes of fiscal adjustments 
based on the behavior  of the primary  budget deficit, identifying which 
are persistent  and which are not, and finally, characterizing  the asso- 
ciated macroeconomic  developments.7  We also examine  the deficit cor- 
rected for cyclicality using a method based on the work of Olivier 
Blanchard, as described in appendix A below.8 We consider primary 
rather than total deficits-that  is,  we exclude interest payments- 
because we are interested  in discretionary  changes in fiscal variables. 
The Persistence  of Fiscal  Consolidations 
We define a year of tight fiscal policy as a year when the ratio of the 
primary  deficit to GDP falls (or the ratio of the surplus to GDP in- 
creases) by at least 1.5 percentage  points. Such a fiscal adjustment  can 
either be successful or unsuccessful: we define success in relation to 
6.  See Giavazzi  and Pagano  (1990, 1996);.Alesina  and  Perotti  (1995, 1996, 1997a); 
Alesina and Ardagna  (1998); McDermott  and Wescott (1996); International  Monetary 
Fund  (1996); Perotti  (1997). 
7.  This section revisits and updates evidence originally presented  in Alesina and 
Perotti  (1995,  1997a). 
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Table 1. Composition  of Successful  and Unsuccessful  Adjustments,  No Cyclical 
Correctiona 
Percentage  points  of GDP 
Number  of 
Sample  observations  CHDEF  CHEXP  CHREV 
Successful  adjustmentsb  23  -2.61  -  1.73  0.88 
(0.21)  (0.28)  (0.26) 
Unsuccessful  adjustmentsb  49  - 2.16  - 0.58  1.58 
(0.  1 1)  (0.  19)  (0.15) 
Source: For sources of all data and explanations of all variables, see appendix A. 
a. Table gives means and standard deviations (in parentheses) from a panel that is described in appendix A. The panel 
spans 1965-95,  but in this table 1993-95  are excluded, since the success of an adjustment  cannot be determined until three 
years after it occurred. Deficit is not cyclically  corrected. 
b.  In this table, a country-year observation counts as an adjustment year if the ratio of the primary deficit to GDP is 
reduced by at least 1.5 percentage points (CHDEF  -  1.5).  An adjustment is successful  if it meets one of the following 
two criteria:  either in the three years following the adjustment  year, the deficit-to-GDP ratio is on average at least 2 percentage 
points below its level in the adjustment  year; or three years after the adjustment, the debt-to-GDP ratio is at least 5 percentage 
points below its level in the adjustment year. In all other cases,  an adjustment is deemed unsuccessful. 
the persistence  of the deficit reduction.  Thus a year  of tight fiscal policy 
is successful if one of the following two conditions applies: either, in 
the three years after the tight year, the ratio of the primary  deficit to 
GDP is on average at least 2 percentage  points below its level in the 
tight year; or, three years after  the year of the adjustment,  the debt-to- 
GDP ratio is at least 5 percentage  points below its level in the adjust- 
ment year. 
For the cyclically corrected  measure,  these thresholds  are applied  to 
the corrected  deficit. The resulting set of years of tight fiscal policy is 
very similar  to the set for uncorrected  deficits. While there is a certain 
amount  of discretion  in the choice of criteria, sensitivity analysis con- 
firms  that the results do not change qualitatively  with different  criteria. 
In the remainder  of this section we use our  data  set of nineteen  OECD 
countries  over the period 1960-95 to investigate  the nature  and effects 
of fiscal adjustments.9  Table 1 presents  summary  statistics for success- 
ful and unsuccessful adjustments.  It shows that in successful adjust- 
ments two-thirds of the deficit reduction comes from spending cuts, 
while in unsuccessful  adjustments  only about  one-quarter  of the adjust- 
ment is on the spending side. The standard  deviations show that the 
9.  Our sample includes the following countries:  Australia,  Austria, Belgium, Can- 
ada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,  Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Nether- 
lands, Norway, Portugal,  Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States; 
see appendix  A for further  details. 202  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1998 
Table  2. Composition  of Successful  and Unsuccessful  Adjustments,  Deficit Cyclically 
Correcteda 
Percentage  points  of GDP 
Number  of 
Sample  observations  COCHDEF  COCHEXP  COCHREV 
Successful  adjustmentsb  19  -2.96  -  1.58  1.37 
(0.34)  (0.33)  (0.47) 
Unsuccessful  adjustmentsb  50  -2.47  -0.62  1.86 
(0.15)  (0.26)  (0.20) 
Source: For sources of all data and explanations of all variables, see appendix A. 
a. Table gives  means and standard deviations (in parentheses) from a panel that is described in appendix A. The panel 
spans 1965-95.  but in this table 1993-95  are excluded, since the success of an adjustment  cannot be determined until three 
years after it occurred. Deficit is cyclically  corrected. 
b.  For definitions of  an adjustment year and the success  of  an adjustment, see  table  1, note b.  In the present table, 
adjustment and success criteria are based on the cyclically  corrected deficit. 
differences are statistically  significant. In regard  to size, the deficit cut 
is only slightly larger in successful than in unsuccessful adjustments. 
This indicates that, independent  of the size of the adjustment,  its com- 
position matters. The qualitative  nature  of the results does not change 
when we use the cyclically corrected  measure  of deficits, as reported 
in table 2. 
Table 3 shows that there are critical differences in the composition 
of spending cuts between successful and unsuccessful adjustments.  In 
successful adjustments  more than  half of the spending  cut derives from 
cuts in transfers and government wages, but in unsuccessful adjust- 
ments these two components are virtually untouched.'0  Alesina and 
Perotti show elsewhere that in successful adjustments,  the cuts in the 
government  wage bill derive from a combination  of reductions  in wage 
rates and in the level,  or at least the growth rate, of public employ- 
ment.11  In some cases, public employment  was very greatly  reduced.'2 
Successful adjustments  also cut nonwage  government  consumption  and 
subsidies more than  in unsuccessful  adjustments.  In sum, in unsuccess- 
ful adjustments  the burden  of spending cuts primarily  falls on public 
investment. 
On the revenue  side, Alesina and  Perotti  show in the same study  that 
10. The average changes in transfers  and the wage bill are significantly  different 
from zero in successful adjustments,  but are not in unsuccessful  adjustments. 
I 1.  Alesina and Perotti  (1997a). 
12. In Ireland, for example, government  employment  fell by about 10 percent  be- 
tween 1986 and 1989, from about  300,000 to 270,000 employees. .t-o  't- 
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the most successful adjustments  do not increase  taxes on labor (that  is, 
household income taxes and social security taxes), but instead rely on 
indirect  taxes and taxes on business to increase revenue. By contrast, 
unsuccessful adjustments  rely heavily on increases in taxes on labor. 
Fiscal  Consolidations  and the Macroeconomy 
Table  4 presents  statistics  on macroeconomic  conditions  before, dur- 
ing, and after successful and unsuccessful adjustments.  Several inter- 
esting observations  emerge. First, the rate of growth  relative to the G7 
countries  increases  during  a successful adjustment  and  decreases  during 
an unsuccessful one. Unemployment  relative to the G7 average falls 
after a successful adjustment  and increases after an unsuccessful ad- 
justment, although  these changes are quite small. Moreover,  the rate  of 
growth relative to the G7 immediately  before a successful adjustment 
is actually lower than that before an unsuccessful one, suggesting that 
success is not due to the fact that the economy was growing rapidly 
before the adjustment. 
Second, during and immediately after a successful adjustment, a 
country  experiences  an investment  "boom," which is much  larger  than 
in an unsuccessful adjustment.  In the two years following a successful 
adjustment,  the rate  of growth  of investment  is 8.58 percent, compared 
with 2.35 percent after an unsuccessful adjustment.  Consumption  also 
increases significantly during a successful adjustment, although the 
difference in the pattern  of consumption  between the two cases is less 
striking  than for investment. 
Third, both successful and unsuccessful adjustments are accom- 
panied  by a currency  depreciation.  13  The depreciation  is slightly larger 
before a successful adjustment. 
Fourth-and  perhaps  most interesting-the  two types of adjustment 
exhibit striking  differences of labor market  behavior. Unit labor costs 
fall before and during successful adjustments,  whereas they increase 
during unsuccessful adjustments.  Two indicators suggest that profits 
increase during successful adjustments and decline in unsuccessful 
ones. The first is the behavior  of the ratio of the manufactured  exports 
13.  In table 4, a minus sign corresponds  to a depreciation. Alberto  Alesina, Roberto Perotti, and Jose Tavares  205 
Table  4. Macroeconomic  Indicators  Before, During, and After Adjustmentsa 
Percentage  points 
Successful adjustmentsb  Unsuccessful adjustmentsb 
Indicator  Beforec  During  Afterc  Beforec  During  Afterc 
lGDPg7  -0.30  0.10  0.19  0.13  -0.30  -0.20 
(0.26)  (0.42)  (0.38)  (0.22)  (0.34)  (0.30) 
UNRg7  1.83  1.87  1.46  -0.14  0.01  0.30 
(1.08)  (1.07)  (1.02)  (0.47)  (0.48)  (0.50) 
AINV  1.82  6.85  8.58  2.16  6.49  2.35 
(1.42)  (1.18)  (1.13)  (1.05)  (1.58)  (1.19) 
ACONS  1.99  3.08  3.32  3.02  3.54  3.25 
(0.37)  (0.50)  (0.40)  (0.30)  (0.33)  (0.36) 
NINTRTg7  2.27  1.86  2.06  2.31  2.97  3.30 
(0.45)  (0.34)  (0.47)  (0.61)  (0.72)  (0.72) 
RINTRTg7  0.28  -1.01  0.40  -1.44  -1.78  -0.16 
(0.61)  (0.74)  (0.40)  (0.42)  (0.49)  (0.39) 
AEFXCHRT  -3.89  -2.15  0.29  -2.90  -2.66  -1.89 
(1.10)  (1.32)  (1.05)  (0.93)  (0.96)  (0.89) 
TB  -0.50  0.56  0.60  -2.38  -1.97  -1.83 
(0.96)  (1.09)  (1.06)  (1.06)  (0.93)  (0.87) 
AULC  -4.48  -1.06  3.25  -0.50  1.27  0.50 
(1.35)  (1.64)  (1.40)  (0.76)  (0.91)  (0.90) 
AVAULC  2.75  4.14  -1.46  0.85  -0.21  -1.47 
(1.27)  (1.44)  (1.09)  (0.74)  (0.98)  (0.84) 
PSH  30.80  31.92  32.09  32.64  32.35  32.80 
(0.88)  (0.89)  (0.88)  (1.03)  (1.00)  (0.95) 
Source: For sources of all data and explanations of all variables, see appendix A. 
a. Table gives GDP-weighted means and standard  deviations (in parentheses) from a panel that is described in appendix 
A. The panel spans 1965-95,  but in this table 1993-95  are excluded, since the success of an adjustment  cannot be determined 
until three years after it occurred. Deficit is not cyclically  corrected. 
b. For definition of the success of an adjustment, see table 1, note b. 
c.  Period before a year t adjustment comprises years t -  2 and t -  1; period after comprises t +  I and t + 2. 
deflator  to unit labor costs.  14 The second is the profit  share, which also 
increases during successful adjustments  but does not in unsuccessful 
ones. The opposite is true for the wage share (not shown). The trade 
14. We use the manufactured  exports  deflator  because  we are  interested  in the effect 
of the changes  in export  profitability-that is, to capture  the "competitiveness  channel" 
discussed in Alesina and Perotti  (1997b). We in fact obtain  a very similar  pattern  when 
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balance improves more during successful adjustments  than it does in 
unsuccessful ones, possibly as a consequence  of the different  behavior 
of unit labor costs. 
The broad picture described is quite robust to several sensitivity 
checks, and it remains largely the same when we use a cyclically ad- 
justed measure  of the change in deficit to identify periods  of tight fiscal 
policy and  successful adjustments.  These results  are  also consistent  with 
those of Alesina and Perotti, using a slightly smaller sample and dif- 
ferent definitions of adjustment  and success.'5 Moreover, an analysis 
of  many case studies of  adjustment  by Alesina and Silvia Ardagna 
points exactly to the same conclusions.  16 
To summarize,  table 4 yields two key regularities.  First, the macro- 
economic environment  does not deteriorate  during successful adjust- 
ments, and the economy performs  better than during  unsuccessful ad- 
justments.  And second,  the behavior of labor market and income 
distribution  variables  displays  a marked  asymmetry  across  the two types 
of fiscal consolidation. 
Finally, a word on monetary  policy. A fiscal adjustment  should be 
less contractionary  if it is accompanied  by loose monetary  policy. An 
exhaustive analysis  of the monetary  stance  of nineteen  OECD  countries 
over the past thirty-five  years is beyond the scope of this paper. How- 
ever, a few simple observations  suggest that  monetary  policy is not the 
whole story behind our results. If it were, one should not observe the 
strong correlation  between the composition of an adjustment  and the 
likelihood of success. Moreover, many of the fiscal adjustments  oc- 
curred  in countries  whose monetary  policies were "locked in" by the 
process of convergence toward  EMU. In some cases, but not all, large 
adjustments  were accompanied  by a devaluation.  However, Alesina and 
Ardagna  show that such nominal devaluations  were effective and im- 
proved  the economic outlook only when accompanied  by explicit wage 
agreements  with the unions. More generally, they argue that nominal 
devaluations cannot be the main explanation for expansionary  fiscal 
adjustments. Supply-side policies,  such as wage agreements and in- 
come policies, accompanied  by non-tax-based  adjustments  are critical. 
15. Alesina and Perotti  (1997a). Their sample  ends in 1993. 
16. Alesina and Ardagna  (1998). Alberto  Alesina, Roberto Perotti, and Jose Tavares  207 
The Theory 
One possible interpretation  of the evidence presented  above is that 
there is a relationship  between the composition of the adjustment,  on 
one side, and  both  its persistence  and  its macroeconomic  consequences, 
on the other. Is there a coherent  theory for this relationship?  The con- 
ventional wisdom, at least among  governments  and international  orga- 
nizations, is that  fiscal consolidations  are always recessionary;  it is the 
textbook  Keynesian  argument.  Conventional  wisdom usually has some 
justification, and it is often unwise to charge at it as did Don Quixote 
against windmills. We do not deny that fiscal consolidations are often 
recessionary,  but  the evidence reviewed above clearly suggests that  this 
is not always the case. Under  what conditions  might a consolidation  be 
expansionary?  In this section we survey some possible-not  mutually 
exclusive-answers  to the two questions raised here. 
Wealth Effects and Expectations 
The observation that a cut in government consumption increases 
private consumption  would not be surprising  in a neoclassical model. 
A permanent  cut in government  consumption, if perceived as such, 
creates a positive wealth effect, because the accompanying  reduction 
in future tax liabilities increases the wealth of the private sector. Ac- 
cording to this model, a fiscal consolidation achieved by a permanent 
reduction  in government  spending  always  increases  private  consumption. 
For the present  purpose, one needs a model in which a reduction  in 
government  consumption  is expansionary  only under  certain  conditions 
relevant  to fiscal consolidations,  and  not under  "normal"  circumstances. 
Table 5 presents the average level of debt at the beginning of the 
adjustment  year and the average change in debt over the three years 
preceding the adjustment  for our full sample, and for the subsamples 
of successful and unsuccessful adjustments.  The table shows that the 
greater  the deterioration  of the fiscal situation, the greater  is the likeli- 
hood that the adjustment  will  succeed. In particular,  the cumulated 
change in the debt in the three years before a successful adjustment  is 
much larger than that before an unsuccessful adjustment. Also,  the 
adjustments  that succeed tend to be undertaken  when public debt as 208  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1998 
Table  5. Average  Debt at Start of Successful  and Unsuccessful  Adjustmentsa 
Percentage points of GDP 
Sample  DEBT  CHDEBT 
All observations  47.33  3.38 
(1.09)  (0.40) 
Successful  adjusmentsb  68.11  13.20 
(5.88)  (2.54) 
Unsuccessful  adjustmentsb  44.34  5.10 
(3.57)  (1.24) 
Source: For sources of all data and explanations of all variables, see appendix A. 
a. Table gives  means and standard deviations (in parentheses) fronm  a panel that is described in appendix A. The panel 
spans 1965-95,  but in this table 1993-95  are excluded, since the success of an adjustment  cannot be determined until three 
years after it occurred. Deficit is not cyclically  corrected. 
b. For definition of the success of an adjustment, see table 1, note b. 
share of GDP is relatively high. In fact, as discussed below, recent 
theoretical  work  emphasizes  that "fiscal stress" is a potentially  impor- 
tant determinant  of the effect of fiscal policy. 
Suppose  that  there  are  real rigidities in the labor  market.  An increase 
in government  consumption  has two effects: it increases employment, 
and  therefore  income and  consumption,  but  it also reduces  private  sector 
wealth, by increasing  the present-discounted  value of taxation. If there 
are credit-constrained  individuals, the first  effect may well prevail. By 
contrast,  if the distortionary  costs of taxation  are  convex, as is generally 
assumed, the second effect becomes stronger as the initial level of 
taxation rises. Hence when the initial level of taxation (in terms of 
present  discounted  value) is high-that  is, when the initial level of debt 
is high-the  second effect might  prevail. This simple model thus offers 
an explanation  for a positive, Keynesian correlation  between govern- 
ment consumption  shocks and changes in private  consumption  in nor- 
mal times, and for a negative, non-Keynesian  correlation  in times of 
fiscal stress, as characterized  by high initial levels of debt. 
In theory, even a tax increase  could have expansionary  effects under 
this model. As with government  consumption, an increase in taxation 
has two opposite effects on consumption. It reduces the disposable 
income, and therefore  the consumption,  of credit-constrained  individ- 
uals; but holding government  expenditure  constant, an increase in tax- 
ation today must imply a fall in taxation tomorrow.17 If the initial 
17. This idea, originally advanced by Blanchard  (1990a), has been modeled as Alberto  Alesina, Roberto  Perotti, and Jose Tavares  209 
expected path of taxation is upward  sloping, this will reduce overall 
distortions  by flattening  the path of taxation.'8  At high levels of debt, 
the initial tax distortions  are high; therefore  the gain from smoothing 
taxation  is great and the second effect prevails. At low levels of debt, 
the opposite occurs. Hence one obtains a Keynesian, negative correla- 
tion between taxation and changes in private consumption  in normal 
times, and a positive correlation  in times of fiscal stress. 
Perotti presents evidence elsewhere on the relative importance  of 
Keynesian  and non-Keynesian  effects of taxation  and government  con- 
sumption.  19  When he regresses change in private consumption  on un- 
expected changes in government  consumption  and in taxation, holding 
constant change in disposable income, the coefficient of government 
consumption  surprises  is positive and significant in normal times but 
negative and significant  in periods of fiscal stress, defined as those in 
which the debt-to-GDP  ratio is high and rapidly  increasing.20  There is 
much less evidence of significant  asymmetry  in the effects of taxation. 
These results are therefore consistent with the evidence presented 
above, that better macroeconomic developments are associated with 
successful fiscal consolidations, which reduce government  consump- 
tion,  rather than with unsuccessful consolidations, which increase 
taxes. 
Credibility Effects 
High-debt  countries  pay interest  risk premiums.21  Therefore  a deci- 
sive change in fiscal policy may have large effects on interest rates, 
because of a "discrete" reduction  in default risk and inflation risk.22 
An important  factor  in the size of such credibility  effects is the presence 
described here by Sutherland  (1997) and Perotti (1997).  Bertola and Drazen (1993) 
develop a related  model, which does not, however, derive a clear-cut  empirical  impli- 
cation for the effect of a high level of public debt on the adjustment. 
18. Many  models of the political  economy  of fiscal policy would predict  an upward- 
sloping path  for taxation;  see, for example, Tabellini  and Alesina (1990). 
19.  Perotti  (1997). 
20.  Unexpected  changes in government  consumption  and taxation  are estimated  as 
the residuals  of a vector autoregression. 
21.  See Alesina and others (1992) for empirical  evidence on default risk in OECD 
countries. 
22.  For models with this result, see Calvo (1988); Miller, Skidelsky, and Weller 
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of multiple equilibria. In the "bad" equilibrium,  the budget deficit is 
high, the risk premium  is high, and the large interest burden makes 
fiscal balance  more  difficult  to achieve and  default  more  likely-so  that 
the high risk premium  is rational. In the "good" equilibrium, a low 
risk premium means that the interest burden is lower and facilitates 
balancing  the budget-so  that  the low risk premium  is rational.  Thus a 
decisive deficit reduction  policy can bring about a switch from a sub- 
optimal  equilibrium  with a high risk premium  and a high probability  of 
default to an equilibrium  with less risk and lower interest rates. The 
presence  of multiple  equilibria  implies that  even a relatively  small fiscal 
adjustment  may have large effects on interest rates. This credibility 
effect may stimulate all those components  of private demand  that are 
very sensitive to interest  rates, especially investment. 
The initial level of debt may still be important  in this context. In 
fact, the risk premium is likely to be a nonlinear function of debt: 
nonexistent for low or moderate  levels of debt but present with high 
debt-to-GDP  ratios.23  Furthermore,  a given decrease in the risk pre- 
mium reduces total deficits more, the larger  is the initial level of debt. 
Labor Markets 
The evidence presented  above points to the importance  of labor  mar- 
kets. We identify two empirical regularities in this respect. On one 
hand, successful consolidations reduce government expenditure on 
wages and refrain from increasing labor taxes, whereas unsuccessful 
consolidations  do the opposite. On the other hand, unit labor  costs and 
the wage share fall immediately  before and during  successful consoli- 
dations, but do not during  unsuccessful consolidations. 
These patterns  can be rationalized  in terms  of labor  market  dynamics 
and  institutions.  The economies in our  sample  are  unionized  to different 
degrees. In unionized labor markets, the aggregate labor supply may 
be quite elastic, even though the individual labor supply is  widely 
regarded  to be inelastic. When government  wage consumption  falls, 
the bargaining  power of unions falls and labor costs decline. By con- 
trast, an increase in labor  taxation  shifts the aggregate  supply of labor, 
because it reduces the aftertax  income of employed union members. 
The unions will demand  higher real wages to compensate for the in- 
23.  Alesina and others  (1992) present  evidence of this nonlinearity. Alberto  Alesina, Roberto Perotti, and Jose Tavares  211 
crease in taxes. Hence the widely different  behavior  of unit labor  costs 
and  the wage share  between successful and  unsuccessful  consolidations 
can be plausibly explained by differences in the composition of the 
adjustments. 
Alesina and Perotti show elsewhere that the effect of taxes on unit 
labor costs relative to a country's trading  partners  is empirically im- 
portant.24  They divide a sample including almost all the OECD coun- 
tries into three groups, characterized  by high, low,  or intermediate 
levels of labor union centralization.  In countries with low centraliza- 
tion, the labor market  is relatively competitive. In this case, the stan- 
dard  neoclassical labor supply effects hold. In countries  with high de- 
grees of centralization,  the unions are so large and all-encompassing 
that they can fully internalize a fiscal adjustment  by the government. 
This implies that the unions may not try to recover the value of a tax 
hike by raising wages,  because they internalize the government's 
budget constraint. In countries with an intermediate  level of centrali- 
zation, labor unions are strong enough to shift on to the pretax wage 
most of the increase in labor taxation, but cannot fully internalize  the 
fiscal adjustment  and coordinate  a wage moderation  policy to facilitate 
the fiscal adjustment.  Alesina and Perotti  estimate that in this group  of 
countries, increasing the income tax by 1 percent of GDP may cause 
an increase  in relative unit labor  costs of up to 2 percent. This effect is 
smaller  both in countries  with very high levels of union centralization, 
such as those in Scandinavia,  and  in countries  with low levels of union- 
ization, such as the United States and Canada. 
Alesina and Ardagna  examine a selection of the fiscal adjustments 
in our sample and show that wage moderation  in exchange for low tax 
increases, or explicit incomes policies, is an important  aspect of suc- 
cessful fiscal consolidations.25  In some cases, such wage moderation 
has resulted from "consensus"  between government and the trade 
unions; in others, the government  has curtailed  the unions' power. 
In fact, it may be that the main channels  through  which fiscal policy 
affects the economy in OECD countries  are the cost side of firms and 
relative unit labor costs. This point is typically overlooked in research 
based on the assumption of perfectly competitive labor markets-a 
24.  Alesina and Perotti  (1997b). 
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highly implausible assumption  for most European  countries. Also, as 
we argue  below, from  a political point  of view, union  behavior  is critical 
in determining  the success of fiscal adjustments. 
Fiscal policy can influence labor supply in a representative  agent, 
perfectly competitive, neoclassical model. But the direction  of the ef- 
fects is often contrary  to that indicated  by the empirical  regularities.  A 
cut in unproductive  government  consumption, for example, increases 
the wealth of individuals, and reduces their labor supply if leisure is a 
normal  good. As a consequence, unit labor costs increase and Tobin's 
investment  q falls, which is exactly the opposite of what the empirical 
evidence on successful consolidations  would suggest.26 
Similarly, the pure neoclassical model is not a promising starting 
point for an analysis of the effects of taxation in large fiscal consoli- 
dations. On one hand, a tax increase  reduces  wealth  and  leisure, thereby 
increasing  labor supply. On the other hand, by the substitution  effect, 
labor  supply decreases. But in general, the empirical  evidence suggests 
that these neoclassical labor supply effects are quite small.27 
Political  Effects of Composition 
Cuts in different categories of spending may have different effects 
on the permanence  of a fiscal adjustment,  as well as on the political 
survival of governments,  for at least three reasons. 
EXPECTATION EFFECTS. Different  types of cut may inherently  be more 
or less permanent.  For instance, postponing  the maintenance  of public 
capital may be only a short-term  strategy. By contrast, changes in 
eligibility criteria  and  benefit  reductions  for social security  and  welfare 
programs  have long-lasting effects.  Since welfare cuts are-and  are 
perceived to be-more  permanent, they may have strong positive 
wealth and expectation effects, because they signal permanent  reduc- 
tions in the level of taxes. 
From a political standpoint,  however, cuts in welfare spending  may 
be particularly  unpopular  (especially in Europe),  whereas  cuts in public 
investment are less visible and costly in the short run, although  they 
come at a higher  long-run  cost in terms  of the productivity  of infrastruc- 
26.  Baxter and King (1993) illustrate  the effects of tax and spending policies on 
labor  supply and output  in a real business-cycle  model. 
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ture. If politicians care more about the short run than the long, they 
will be biased in favor of investment  cuts. Kenneth  Rogoff presents a 
model in which, because of lags in information,  even rational  voters 
reward  incumbent  governments  for choosing to cut investment  rather 
than current spending.28 Moreover,  welfare cuts might imply an 
increase in post-tax income inequality, which could be an political 
liability. 
POLITICAL  CREDIBILITY. Since welfare cuts may be a particularly  sen- 
sitive issue, governments  willing to cut spending  on welfare and  wages 
signal that  they are  really serious about  the fiscal adjustment  and accept 
the political risk associated with it. This type of fiscal adjustment  thus 
enjoys increased  credibility and may have a stronger  effect on interest 
rates. 
Tavares shows that this effect is particularly  strong for left-wing 
governments. Given the preferences of their constituency, it is more 
costly for left-wing governments  to cut public spending.  If they actually 
do so, they signal strong  commitment  to the fiscal adjustment  and  build 
credibility.29 
LABOR MARKET EFFECTS. Cuts in government  wages and  employment 
will have a different effect on labor supply than will cuts in nonwage 
government  consumption.  A fall in government  employment  shifts the 
aggregate  demand  facing the union, implying a reduction  of unit labor 
costs. The political costs of cutting government  wages or employment 
may be quite high, though-not  so much at the ballot box, but because 
such policies go against the interests  of entrenched  bureaucracies. 
Summary 
Fiscal adjustments  that rely on cuts in government transfers and 
wages and are implemented  in periods of fiscal stress are long lasting 
and are not contractionary.  On the demand  side, the expansionary  as- 
pect of such fiscal adjustments  works through an expectation effect, 
which is stronger  the worse are initial fiscal conditions. On the supply 
side, the interaction  of certain  types of adjustment-those  without tax 
increases  but with cuts in government  employment  and  wages-lead  to 
28.  Rogoff (1990). 
29.  Tavares  (1998). This is an example  of the "why it takes  a Nixon to go to China" 
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wage moderation, reduced relative unit labor costs, and increases in 
profitability,  business investment, and production. 
Type of Cabinet and Fiscal Adjustments 
In this section we summarize  the relationship  between cabinets  with 
various  party  structures  and  ideological complexions  and  fiscal policies. 
In particular, we look at which types of cabinet are more likely to 
follow deficit reduction  policies, and how persistent  their policies are 
likely to be. 
Data 
We use the sample of  nineteen OECD countries over the period 
1960-95  described  above. The main variable  of interest  is the change 
in the primary  deficit. Interest  payments  are  excluded, since the purpose 
of the exercise is to study the effects of discretionary  fiscal policy, and 
interest rates are not under  the direct control of governments,  particu- 
larly in small open economies. We measure the deficit as a share of 
GDP. 
A crucial  issue that  arises here is whether  to use a cyclically adjusted 
measure of the primary  deficit or the uncorrected  measure. There are 
valid arguments  for either method. On the one hand, in favor of using 
the adjusted  measure,  voters may try  to distinguish  cyclical effects from 
purposeful  changes in spending  and taxation. For instance, an increase 
in the deficit due to a surge in unemployment  and the associated  rise in 
the volume of unemployment  compensation  payments  may not be re- 
garded in the same way as a deficit increase due to additional  discre- 
tionary  spending. Conversely, a deficit reduction  due to a high growth 
rate may not be perceived in the same way as a deficit reduction 
achieved by raising tax rates. But on the other  hand, voters may not be 
very accurate  in distinguishing  between discretionary  policy and  cycli- 
cal effects of the budget;  even professional  economists cannot  agree on 
an appropriate  cyclical correction.  We show below, however, that our 
results are qualitatively  very robust  to both the cyclically corrected  and 
the uncorrected  measures  of the primary  deficit. 
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ernment  and  their  ideological bent. We distinguish  between single party 
cabinets and coalition cabinets, composed of members  of two or more 
of the national  parties. For ideological alignment, we adopt a cabinet 
ideology  indicator  that is  widely  used  in the political  science 
literature.30 
For this exercise, our definition  of tight and loose fiscal policy is a 
generalization  from that  used above. A year of tight fiscal policy is one 
in which the change in the ratio of the primary  deficit to GDP is less 
than or equal to  -  1.5 percentage  points; and a year of loose policy is 
one in which the change in the same ratio is greater  than or equal to 
1.5 percentage  points. 
We use the same definition  of success as above: a successful adjust- 
ment is a year of tight policy such that either it is followed by three 
years in which the average  ratio  of the primary  deficit to GDP is at least 
2 percentage  points lower than  in the tight year;  or three  years after  the 
tight policy, the debt-to-GDP  ratio is 5 percentage  points lower than it 
was in that year. 
Results 
Table 6 illustrates  the relative frequencies  of the various outcomes 
as a function of government  characteristics.  Note that we distinguish 
successful and  unsuccessful  adjustments  only for tight  periods.  The first 
column identifies the frequencies of particular  government  character- 
istics. For instance, the first entry in the column, 0.53,  identifies the 
frequency of single party cabinets in the panel of government-years, 
whereas the first entry in the second column presents the relative fre- 
quency  with which cabinets  of this type pursue  loose policies. The other 
entries may be interpreted  in a similar manner. 
The table shows that the ideological orientation  of government  does 
not seem to have much influence on the frequency  of loose and tight 
episodes. Although left-wing governments  have a higher frequency  of 
loose policies, they are also more likely to follow tight policies than 
right-wing  governments.31  In fact, there are several examples of right- 
30.  This indicator  is presented  in Budge, Keman, and Woldendorp  (1993) and is 
described  below. See appendix  A for further  details on all definitions  and sources. 
31.  This finding is consistent with that of Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen (1997). In 
their study of political business cycles in OECD countries, they use panel regressions kr)00  CO0~C 
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wing governments that run large deficits, including the two Reagan 
administrations  in the United States in the 1980s and the Conservative 
government  in Sweden in the late 1970s.32  In Italy during the 1970s 
and 1980s, deficits occurred  regardless  of the political complexion of 
the cabinet. The table also indicates that the probability  of success- 
that is, the ratio of successful adjustments  to the total number  of tight 
adjustments-is  virtually  identical  for left-wing  and right-wing 
governments. 
Most interesting,  the probability  of success is much  lower for centrist 
governments  relative to right- and left-wing governments,  and for co- 
alition governments  relative to single party  governments.  These obser- 
vations are two sides of the same coin, since all centrist governments 
are coalition governments. Specifically, the table shows that coalition 
governments  implement  tight policies as often as do single party  gov- 
ernments, but these initiatives almost never lead to long-lasting fiscal 
adjustments.  The finding that fragmented  governments have greater 
difficulty in permanently  consolidating  the budget and typically fail in 
their attempts  to do so is validated  empirically  by several studies.33  It 
is also consistent with theoretical  models that emphasize the effect of 
a fragmented  decision process on the timing of fiscal stabilizations.34 
Fiscal Adjustments and Changes in Government 
In this section we consider  the electoral  consequences  of fiscal policy 
in general, and of fiscal adjustments  in particular. 
Data 
For this exercise, in addition  to the variables  considered  in the pre- 
vious section, we need to define the instances when there is a change 
to examine whether  the average level of the budget deficit is higher for left- or right- 
wing cabinets, with inconclusive  results. 
32.  These episodes inspired  Persson  and Svensson (1989), who model the incentive 
for a right-wing cabinet to run a deficit in order to reduce the level of government 
spending  that  future  cabinets  are able to finance. 
33.  See Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991); Alesina and Perotti (1995); 
Kontopoulos  and Perotti  (1997); Hallerberg  and von Hagen (1997). 
34.  See, for example, Alesina and  Drazen  (1991); Spolaore  (1993); Velasco (1996). 218  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1998 
in government.35  We start  from the set of all government  terminations 
(TERM);  that is, any instance in which a government  ends, regardless 
of the reason. A government  termination  may or may not lead to a 
change in government. We consider two overlapping  types of change 
in government:  a change of prime minister (PMCH) and a change in 
the ideological orientation  of the cabinet  (IDEOCH).  These are dummy 
variables, equal to one when a change  occurs. The two sets are distinct, 
so that in the United Kingdom, for example, the replacement  of Mar- 
garet  Thatcher  by John  Major  is classified as PMCH  but not IDEOCH, 
while the replacement  of John  Major  by Tony Blair is classified as both 
PMCH and IDEOCH.36  Changes of prime minister are more frequent 
than changes in ideology, because often the leadership  of a major  co- 
alition party  changes, and  hence also the prime  minister,  although  there 
is no accompanying  change  in the ideology of the cabinet  overall. Note, 
however, that ideological changes are not simply a subset of changes 
of prime minister:  the same prime minister  might lead two successive 
coalition cabinets  with compositions  sufficiently  different  that  they cor- 
respond  to different  ideologies.37  A third  dummy  variable  (ALLCH)  is 
defined  to be equal to one when a change either  of ideology or of prime 
minister occurs. The number of positive observations of ALLCH  is 
higher than for either  PMCH or IDEOCH  and smaller  than for TERM. 
The  definition  of  change  of  prime  minister  change  is  self- 
explanatory. In some cases when there is a change of prime minister 
but no change in the supporting  coalition, the prime  minister  retired  for 
health  reasons  rather  than  for any policy-related  reason. There  are only 
a handful  of such cases, however, and we have verified  that  our results 
would not change if we eliminated  these from our sample. We do not 
exclude cases when an incumbent  prime minister chooses not to run, 
since that decision may in itself be an endogenous  response to policy, 
and therefore  excluding such observations  would bias our results. For 
35.  Details of data sources and the construction  of all variables are provided in 
appendix  A. 
36.  For the United States, we consider  a change  of president  equivalent  to a change 
of prime minister  in all other countries. This implies that we classify a change in the 
party  of the president  as a change in ideology. 
37.  A change in the party composition of the cabinet is a necessary, but not a 
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example, a prime  minister  may choose not to run  for another  term  if he 
is perceived as unpopular  and unlikely to win.38 
The definition  of what  constitutes  an ideological change, by contrast, 
is not obvious. We have adopted and updated a measure commonly 
used by political scientists. This first classifies political parties on a 
left-right spectrum,  according  to "expert judgments" by political sci- 
entists. It then assigns an ideological index to a cabinet on the basis of 
the weights of the different  parties  that hold ministerial  posts.39 
The reappointment  of the same party  or coalition of parties  to form 
a new cabinet  may indicate  that  voters are satisfied  with current  policy. 
But the party  composition of the cabinet is not the direct choice of the 
voters; instead, it results from postelectoral  negotiations  between par- 
ties whose relative strength does not fluctuate greatly over time. In 
some extreme  cases, such as Japan,  the political system makes  a change 
in the ideological character  of the cabinet very unlikely. Conversely, 
the replacement  of a prime minister  may reflect voters' dissatisfaction 
with the fiscal policies pursued  under  his leadership,  even though  they 
are not willing to bring the opposition parties  to power. For our statis- 
tical results, we present two measures of changes in government:  the 
broadest  measure,  ALLCH,  and the more restricted  IDEOCH. 
Table 7 shows the relative frequency of positive  values for the 
dummy  variables  TERM, ALLCH, PMCH,  and IDEOCH  in  the  full 
sample and for each country.  Out of a total of 631 usable observations, 
291 are cabinet terminations, 164 are changes of prime minister, and 
ninety-five are changes in ideology. The country  with the most termi- 
nations is Italy, with twenty-nine. The countries  with the least are the 
Netherlands  and the United States, with eleven terminations  each.40 
Italy also has the highest number  of changes of prime minister, while 
Austria, Canada,  and Germany  have the lowest number. 
38.  We also eliminate the transition  from Ronald Reagan to George Bush in the 
United  States, since Reagan  was barred,  under  the Constitution,  from  running  for a third 
term. 
39.  Budge, Keman, and Woldendorp  (1993). See appendix  A for a more detailed 
exposition of our procedures. 
40.  One might expect a relative  frequency  of 0.25 for TERM  for the United States, 
since the Constitution  fixes the presidential  term  at four years. Note, however, that  our 
sample includes the assassination  of John F. Kennedy and the resignation  of Richard 
Nixon, both of which are counted  as terminations  in table 7. 220  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1998 
Table 7. Frequency  of Government  Terminations  and Cabinet  Changes,  by Country, 
1965-95a 
Frequency 
Country  TERM  ALLCH  PMCH  IDEOCH 
Australia  0.53  0.22  0.22  0.14 
Austria  0.36  0.19  0.14  0.14 
Belgium  0.47  0.33  0.25  0.28 
Canada  0.33  0.14  0.14  0.00 
Denmark  0.58  0.33  0.22  0.28 
Finland  0.56  0.44  0.44  0.19 
France  0.53  0.42  0.39  0.14 
Germany  0.44  0.14  0.14  0.08 
Greece  0.33  0.28  0.28  0.17 
Ireland  0.42  0.25  0.22  0.14 
Italy  0.80  0.56  0.56  0.19 
Japan  0.58  0.33  0.33  0.03 
Netherlands  0.30  0.28  0.22  0.14 
Norway  0.44  0.33  0.28  0.30 
Portugal  0.53  0.37  0.32  0.32 
Spain  0.39  0.17  0.17  0.11 
Sweden  0.47  0.28  0.25  0.11 
United Kingdom  0.33  0.19  0.19  0.11 
United States  0.30  0.22  0.22  0.14 
All countriesb  0.46  0.29  0.26  0.15 
Source: For sources of all data and explanations of all variables, see appendix A. 
a. For each country, table gives mean of a given dummy variable across all years in the sample. Sample begins after 1965 
for some countries; see appendix A. 
b. Gives variable means for entire panel. 
As mentioned  above, we use the sample of changes irrespective  of 
whether a transition  to a new cabinet occurs by means of elections, 
cabinet reshuffling, or other procedures.  In certain countries, such as 
the United States, almost all changes in government  occur as a result 
of general elections, but in many other countries  government  resigna- 
tions and coalition reshuffles take place without elections.41  We have 
examined whether our results differ substantially  when we use only 
changes following elections, but find that they do not. Therefore  we 
present results using changes following  any type of termination, 
whether  or not it follows an election. 
Another  important  data  issue concerns  the timing of changes in gov- 
ernment  within the calendar  year, relative to the fiscal year. Suppose 
41.  The exceptions  for the United  States in our sample  are the replacements  of John 
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Table 8.  Correlations  Among  Deficit and Cabinet  Change  Variablesa 
Correlation coefficient 
CHDEF  COCHDEF  TOTCHDEF  TERM  ALLCH  PMCH 
COCHDEF  0.72  1.00 
TOTCHDEF  0.79  0.60  1.00 
TERM  0.13  0.28  0.31  1.00 
ALLCH  0.04  0.16  0.23  0.82  1.00 
PMCH  0.06  0.27  0.26  0.81  0.96  1.00 
IDEOCH  -0.05  -0.11  0.18  0.38  0.55  0.36 
Source: For sources of all data and explanations of all variables, see appendix A. 
a. Panel spans  1965-95,  as described in appendix A.  Correlations are among the residuals that result from regressing 
these variables on country dummies. 
that  a government  terminates  in June  of year t. Should  one consider  the 
fiscal variables of year t as before or after government  termination? 
This choice clearly has implications for the correspondence  between 
fiscal policies and the government  changes that are seen as a response 
to those policies.  We adopt the following simple convention: every 
termination  that occurs between July 1 of year t and June 30 of year 
t+  1 is considered  to fall in calendar  year t; therefore  it is considered 
contemporaneous  to the fiscal outcomes of year t. In other words, the 
fiscal policy of year t is regarded  as a determinant  of government  col- 
lapses from July 1 of year t to June 30 of year t+  1.42 
We consider three measures  of changes in the deficit: the change in 
the ratio of the primary deficit to GDP from year t-  1  to year t 
(CHDEF); the average value of CHDEF over the term of office of the 
current  cabinet up to year t (TOTCHDEF); and CHDEF corrected  for 
the cycle (COCHDEF).  The correlations  in the panel among  these def- 
initions of changes in the deficit and the cabinet change variables are 
reported  in table 8. 
Note the high positive correlations  between the different  definitions 
of the deficit. More  important,  increases  in the contemporaneous  deficit 
are  weakly but  positively correlated  with changes  in government.  Cycli- 
cally corrected  change in the deficit and change over the term of office 
are more strongly correlated  with cabinet changes. Overall, these sim- 
42.  We have performed  a sensitivity analysis on this definition and find that our 
results  are  qualitatively  unaffected.  For  some reason,  government  terminations  are  much 
more frequent in the first and last quarters  of the year that in the middle two, and 
therefore  moving  the break  point  between  April  and  October  makes  very little difference. 222  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1998 
Figure 1. Frequency  of Cabinet Changes  and Fiscal Adjustmentsa 
Frequency  of cabinet  changes 
All observations 
Current  yeard  Next yeare  Next termination' 
Source: For  sources of all data  and explanations  of all variables,  see appendix  A. 
a. Figure gives mean of dummy variable  ALLCH  for various subsets of country-years in a panel that spans 1960-95  and is 
described in appendix  A. 
b. Panel is restricted  to country-years  in which -1 .5 < CHDEF  < 0. 
c. Includes  only country-years  in which CHDEF?-l  .S. 
d. Bars for small and large fiscal  adjustments  refer  to government  changes occurring  il the same year as the adjustment. 
e. Bars for small and large fiscal adjustments  refer  to government  changes occurring  in the year following the adjustmlent. 
f. Refers to government  changes occurring  at the next termination  (TERM).  Panel  is restricted  to country-years  that  ale followed 
within three  years by a terminationa. 
pie row correlations  provide no evidence that loose fiscal policies lead 
to electoral success or that tight policies lead to defeat. 
Fiscal  Adjustments and the Timing of Changes  in Government 
We now focus on the timing of changes in government  relative to 
the timing of  fiscal adjustments  of different intensities. Recall that 
government changes (ALLCH)  are a subset of terminations  (TERM). 
Figure 1 plots the frequency of ALLCH  against deficit reductions of 
different sizes,  showing contemporaneous changes in government, 
changes that occur one year after  the fiscal adjustment,  and changes in Alberto  Alesina, Roberto Perotti, and Jose'  Tavares  223 
the next termination.  In each case, the figure  presents  the frequency  of 
changes  for the whole sample, for small deficit  reductions,  and  for large 
reductions. 
The first of the left-hand set of bars shows that the frequency of 
ALLCH  for the entire sample is about 0.3,  indicating a change about 
every three years, on average, as one would expect from table 7. The 
second bar  in this set indicates  the frequency  of changes  following small 
adjustments  (that is, 0 to 1.5 percentage  point reductions  in the debt- 
to-GDP ratio), and the third bar indicates the frequency of changes 
following large adjustments  (that  is, reductions  of at least 1.5 percent- 
age points). If governments fell  more often than average following 
periods of fiscal tightening, the second and third  bar  of each set would 
be higher than the first. In fact, irrespective of the timing of change 
after adjustment,  we find no evidence that this is the case. 
The right-hand  set of bars samples only those year that are followed 
within three years by a termination.43  The first bar in this set,  for 
example, indicates that of all the country-year  observations that are 
followed within three years by a termination,  about half are followed 
by a termination  that is a change in government.  Once again, we find 
no evidence that deficit reduction policies increase the frequency of 
political change. 
Figure 2 presents  equivalent  results  for changes  in ideology 
(IDEOCH).  At first  glance it appears  that  ideological changes are more 
frequent  after  large fiscal adjustments  than  after  small adjustments,  and 
are more frequent  than average overall. However, closer examination 
of the data suggests that the evidence is inconclusive. A more detailed 
breakdown  of adjustment  size reveals that the highest frequency of 
IDEOCH  does not occur after the largest adjustments  (that  is, a deficit 
reduction  of more than 2.5 percentage  points of GDP), but rather  in an 
intermediate  range, closer to a 1.5 percentage  point cut in the deficit- 
to-GDP ratio.44  The results obtained  by using the cyclically corrected 
measure  of change  in the deficit  are  virtually  identical  to those presented 
in figures 1 and 2. 
43.  Our sample includes cabinet  tenures  of up to five years. We have verified  that 
our  results  do not change  if we consider  the next termination,  whatever  the time it takes 
to occur, rather  than  a termination  in the next three  years. 
44.  These results are not shown here, but are available  upon request. 224  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1998 
Figure 2. Frequency  of Changes  in Cabinet  Ideology  and Fiscal Adjustments!, 
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Source:  For sources of all data  and explanations  of all viiriables,  see appendix  A. 
a. Figui-e  gives meati of dut-nmy  vai-iable  IDEOCH for various subsets of counti-y-years  in a panel that spans 1960-95  and is 
described  in appendix  A. 
b. Panel is restricted  to coutiti-y-years  in which -1,5 < CHDEF < 0. 
c. Includes  only country-years  in which CHDEF  < -1.5. 
d, Bars for small aiid lai-ge  fiscal adjttstnients  refei-  to ideological changes occurring  in the sitme  year as the adJustment. 
e. Bars for small and large fiscal adjustments  refer to ideological changes occuri-itig  in the yeai-  followinc,  the adjLlstiiieiit. 
f. Refers to ideological changes occuri-ing  at the next termitiation  (TERM).  Panel is restricted  to country-yezirs  that  are followed 
within three  years by a teri-nination. 
Composition  of Adjustments  and  the  Timing  of 
Changes  in Government 
We  argue  above  that  the  most  successful  (that  is,  long  lasting)  ad- 
justments  involve  spending  cuts  rather than tax increases.  Political  rhet- 
oric  suggests  that  spending  cuts,  especially  in welfare  and  social  secu- 
rity  programs,  are  very  unpopular.  However,  the  structure  of  current 
spending  in  most  OECD  countries-in  Europe,  in  particular-is  such 
that  it is  virtually  impossible  to  achieve  significant  spending  cuts  with- 
out  affecting  these  components  of  the  budget.  Whereas  in  the  early 
1960s  government  consumption  represented  more  than half  of  spending Alberto  Alesina, Roberto  Perotti, and Jose Tavares  225 
Figure 3. Frequency  of Cabinet Changes  and Expenditure-  and 
Tax-Based  Adjustmentsa 
Frequency  of cabinet  changes 
E  All observations 
0.30  _I  Large  adjustments' 
Expenditure-based adjustments: 
0.25  -  Tax-based  adjustments 
0.20- 
0.15- 
0.05 
All changes  in cabinet  Changes  in ideology  of cabinet 
Source: For sources  of all data  and explanations  of all variables,  see appendix  A. 
a. Figure  gives either  the mean  of a dummy  variable  indicating  all changes in government  (ALLCH)  or the mean  of a dummy  vari- 
able indicating  changes in government  ideology (IDEOCH),  as specified, for various  subsets of the country-years  in a panel that 
spans 1960-95 and is described  in appendix  A. 
b. Panel is restricted  to country-years  in which CHDEF  <  -1.5. 
c. Includes  only country-year.sin  which CHDEF?<  -1.5  and the change in expenditures  (CHEXP) is less than its median value 
in large  adjustment  years. 
d. Includes  only country-years  in which CHDEF  <  -1.5 and CHEXP  is greater  than its median value in large  adjustment  years. 
in most OECD countries, over the past thirty years the transfer and 
welfare components of the budget have grown much faster than gov- 
ernment  consumption, so that relative size of the two components  as a 
fraction  of total spending  has been reversed. 
Figure 3 relates  the composition  of adjustments  to contemporaneous 
government  changes. We focus on large adjustments,  defined  as deficit 
reductions  of 1.5 percentage  points of GDP or more.45  We also divide 
45.  We choose this threshold  of deficit reduction  to isolate really large adjustments 
while maintaining  a fair number  of observations;  a threshold  of 2.5 percentage  points 
would yield far fewer observations.  Our  results  are not highly sensitive to the choice of 
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these large adjustments  into "spending-based"  adjustments  (those with 
spending  cuts greater  than  the median  for large adjustments)  and "tax- 
based" adjustments  (those with spending  cuts below the median). Fig- 
ure 3 shows, first, that in years with a fiscal adjustment  of at least 1.5 
percentage  points of GDP, the frequency  of ALLCH  is lower than the 
overall frequency in the panel, as seen also in figure 1  .46  Second, at 
least in the case of  contemporaneous  effects,  governments seem to 
survive in office more often when they cut spending than when they 
increase taxes. 
Figure  4 focuses on government  wages and is organized  in the same 
way as figure 3. It shows that governments  that choose to cut govern- 
ment wages more have a higher probability  of survival. The result is 
particularly  striking for ALLCH. Figure 5 examines transfers in the 
same manner.  While the results  for  ALLCH  show no difference  between 
"transfer-based"  and other adjustments,  the results for IDEOCH  sug- 
gest that the probability  of survival is higher for governments  that do 
not cut transfers. 
In summary,  our results  up to this point offer no evidence that  voters 
punish governments  for reducing deficits. In the case of large adjust- 
ments, it seems that if a government  relies mostly on spending  cuts- 
and on cuts in government  wages, in particular-it  is less likely to fall. 
Fiscal Adjustments and the Probability of 
Change in Government 
In this section we estimate the probability  of change in government 
as a function of several economic variables and characteristics  of the 
cabinet. Our purpose is to determine the effect of changes in fiscal 
stance on the probability  of a cabinet's survival. We run  probit  regres- 
sions  on our panel with a measure of cabinet change (ALLCH  or 
IDEOCH) as the dependent  variable. For each definition  of change in 
cabinet, we estimate the effect of a 1 percentage  point change in the 
deficit-to-GDP  ratio, according  to one of three  definitions:  using change 
in the uncorrected  deficit (CHDEF), using change in the cyclically 
46.  In other words, the first and second bars of each set in figure  3. are equivalent 
to the first  and  third  bars  of each set in figure 1, measuring  the contemporaneous  change 
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Figure 4. Frequency  of Cabinet Changes  and Government  Wage-  and 
Non-Wage-Based  Adjustments' 
Frequency  of cabinet  changes 
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Source: For  sources of all data and explanations  of all variables,  see appendix  A. 
a. Figure  gives either  the mean  of a dummy  variable  indicating  all changes in government  (ALLCH)  or the mean  of a dummy  vari- 
able indicating  changes in government  ideology (IDEOCH),  as specified, for various  subsets of the country-years  in a panel that 
spans 1960-95 and is described  in appendix  A. 
b. Panel is restricted  to country-years  in which CHDEF < -1.5. 
c. Includes  only country-years  in which CHDEF < - 1.5 and the change in government  wages (CHCGW)  is less than its median 
value in large adjustment  years. 
d. Includes  only country-years  in which CHDEF  < -1.5  and CHCGW  is greater  than its median  value in large  adjustment  years. 
corrected deficit (COCHDEF), or average change in the ratio during 
the tenure  of the current  cabinet (TOTCHDEF). 
In addition, we introduce  three other macroeconomic  indicators  as 
right-hand-side  variables:  GDP growth  (AGDP), the growth  rate  of the 
unemployment  rate (AUNR), and the inflation  rate (INFL). The moti- 
vation for these controls is straightforward:  GDP growth, unemploy- 
ment, and inflation are the standard  macroeconomic  variables consid- 
ered in the literature  on the determinants  of voting behavior.47  Although 
47.  For the United States, see, in particular,  Kramer  (1971); Fair (1978); Alesina 
and Rosenthal  (1995). For other OECD countries, see Lewis-Beck (1988); Powell and 
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Figure  5. Frequency  of Cabinet Changes  and Transfer-  and Non-Transfer-Based 
Adjustmentsa 
Frequency  of cabinet  changes 
L  All observations  Transfer-based  adjustments: 
0.30  -  Large  adjustmentsh  Non-transfer-based  adjustmentsd 
0.25- 
0.20 
0.15- 
0.10 
0.05 
All changes  in cabinet  Changes  in ideology  of cabinet 
Source: For  sources of all data and explanations  of all variables,  see appendix  A. 
a. Figure  gives either  the mean  of a dummy  variable  indicating  all changes in government  (ALLCH)  or the mean  of a dummy  vari- 
able indicating  changes in governtnent  ideology (IDEOCH). as specified, for various subsets of the country-years  in a panel that 
spans 19611-95  and is described  in appendix  A. 
b. Panel is restricted  to country-years  in which CHDEF S -1.5. 
c. Includes  only country-years  in which CHDEF?S  -1.5 and  the chanige  in transfers  (CHTRF)  is less than  its median  value in large 
adjustimient  years. 
d. Includes  only country-years  in which CHDEF?S  -1.5 and CHTRF  is greater  than its median  value in large  adjustment  years. 
the level of unemployment  varies  across  countries  it is very persistent  in 
many  countries.48  Hence we use the rate  of growth  of the unemployment 
rate rather  than its level as a dependent  variable.49  The inflation  rate is 
intended  to capture  the conventional  wisdom and well-documented  fact 
that  people dislike inflation  and  may punish  governments  for it.50 
We also control for three characteristics  of cabinets that may affect 
48.  For a classic study on unemployment  persistence  in Europe, see Summers  and 
Blanchard  (1990). 
49.  We have tried  both using the rate  of change  of the unemployment  rate  and  using 
the simple difference in the unemployment  rate. The results are not affected by this 
distinction, and here we present  only those using the rate  of change. 
50.  See Shiller (1996) for empirical  evidence. Alberto  Alesina, Roberto  Perotti, and Jose Tavares  229 
the  likelihood  of  their  political  survival:  number of  years  in  power 
(DURAT); whether it is supported by a majority in parliament (MAJ); 
and whether it is  of  a coalition  of  two  or more parties (COAL). The 
probability of a change in government should increase with tenure; and 
coalition  governments  and those not supported by a parliamentary ma- 
jority should be weaker and more likely  to collapse.51 
Table 9 presents results of the probit specifications  for the full sam- 
ple.  In each case,  the deficit variable is statistically  insignificant,  irre- 
spective  of the way we measure changes  in the deficit and in cabinets. 
This is a crucial  finding: there is no evidence  that fiscal  profligacy  is 
associated  with longer survival  in office. 
The coefficients  on growth and unemployment are insignificant,  even 
though they display  the expected  signs  in most cases.  The coefficient 
on inflation has the expected  sign and is statistically  significant,  what- 
ever  the  specification:  higher  inflation  increases  the  probability  of  a 
government  change.  These  findings  are consistent  with  the  existing 
literature. For example,  G.  Bingham Powell  Jr. and Guy Whitten and 
Martin Paldam consider elections  in OECD countries and find insignif- 
icant effects  of  growth and unemployment  on voting  behavior.  Kaare 
Strom and Martin Lipset  obtain similar results  on growth  and unem- 
ployment  but significant  results  on  inflation,  particularly from  1973. 
Michael  Lewis-Beck's  results  on  a  smaller  sample  of  countries  are 
consistent  with these.52 
Our results on the political  controls  are highly  consistent  with con- 
ventional wisdom,  as well as with the existing  literature. On all of these 
variables the coefficients  have the expected  signs  and are statistically 
significant.  Ceteris paribus,  coalition  governments  and minority  gov- 
ernments are more likely  to fall  in any given  period: a coalition  gov- 
ernment is about 11 to 15 percent more likely  to fall than a single party 
government,  while  a majority  cabinet  has  about  an 8  to  11 percent 
lower probability of falling  than a minority cabinet.  The weakest type 
of government is thus an alliance  of two or more parties that does  not 
51.  See Powell and Whitten  (1993). 
52.  Powell and Whitten (1993); Paldam  (1991); Strom and Lipset (1984); Lewis- 
Beck (1988). The United  States  is an important  exception  to this pattern.  There  is a vast 
literature  showing that the rate of GDP growth, and to a lesser extent unemployment 
and inflation, are important  determinants  of presidential  elections; see,  in particular, 
Kramer  (1971); Fair  (1978); Alesina and Rosenthal  (1995). 230  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1998 
Table  9. Probit Regressions  Predicting Cabinet Changes, Whole Samplea 
Independent  Dependent  variable 
variable  ALLCH  ALLCH  ALLCH  IDEOCH  IDEOCH  IDEOCH 
CHDEF  -0.020  -0.017 
(-0.54)  (-0.39) 
-0.007  -0.004 
COCHDEF  0.009  -0.006 
(0.26)  (-0.16) 
0.003  -0.001 
TOTCHDEF  0.015  -0.014 
(0.34)  (-0.26) 
0.005  -0.003 
AGDPb  -0.010  -0.005  -0.020  -0.026  -0.024  -0.044 
(-0.34)  (-0.21)  (-0.69)  (-0.85)  (-0.80)  (-  1.29) 
-0.003  -0.002  -0.006  -0.005  -0.005  -0.010 
AUNRb  0.003  0.003  -0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001 
(1.17)  (1.00)  (-0.04)  (0.46)  (0.38)  (0.23) 
0.001  0.001  -0.000  0.003  0.002  0.002 
INFLb  0.029  0.030  0.031  0.026  0.026  0.023 
(2.61)  (2.64)  (2.59)  (2.05)  (2.05)  (1.69) 
0.010  0.010  0.010  0.006  0.006  0.005 
DURAT  0.185  0.186  0.181  0.228  0.228  0.224 
(3.31)  (3.31)  (3.22)  (3.64)  (3.64)  (3.57) 
0.061  0.061  0.060  0.049  0.049  0.049 
COAL  0.456  0.465  0.461  0.511  0.516  0.512 
(3.63)  (3.72)  (3.62)  (3.44)  (3.49)  (3.39) 
0.150  0.153  0.152  0.112  0.114  0.113 
MAJ  -0.246  -0.242  -0.264  -0.403  -0.402  -0.447 
(-1.72)  (-  1.69)  (-  1.82)  (-2.43)  (-2.42)  (-2.66) 
-0.083  -0.082  -0.090  -0.096  -0.096  -0.109 
Summary  statistic 
Log likelihood  -  326.71  - 326.56  -  318.01  - 230.89  - 203.85  -  155.93 
N  583  582  564  583  582  564 
Source: For sources of all data and explanations of all variables, see appendix A. 
a. Probit regressions include a constant and use the panel of country-years described in appendix A. Each set of entries 
includes the coefficient, the t statistic (in parentheses), and the marginal  effect of a one unit change in the regressor (evaluated 
at the means of all regressors). 
b. When TOTCHDEF is included as the deficit change variable, given variables are replaced by ATOTGDP, ATOTUNR, 
and ATOTINFL, as appropriate, and corresponding coefficients are reported. Alberto  Alesina, Roberto  Perotti, and Jose Tavares  231 
hold a majority  in the legislature. Not surprisingly,  the probability  of a 
change in government  increases with tenure. 
The results in table 9 are robust  to various sensitivity analyses. For 
example, they do not change when we drop the political or economic 
control variables, either as a group or individually, or when we intro- 
duce country  dummies.53  We also check whether,  conditional  on a given 
year being a termination,  the probability  of a change in prime minister 
or ideology is affected by the fiscal policy variable, by isolating the 
sample of years when there was a termination  and running  the specifi- 
cations presented  in the table. Once again, we find no evidence of an 
effect of deficit cuts on the probability  of government  survival, either 
with the corrected  deficit or with the uncorrected  deficit. 
An important  possibility is that  there  is a lag between  the adjustment 
and the electoral fortunes of the government.  We run the same probit 
specifications  but lag each of the independent  variables  by one year. We 
construct  similar  variables  for change  of cabinet  in the next termination, 
whenever  it occurs. Our  results  confirm  that  cabinets  that  cut deficits  are 
not punished  by voters  at any time in the future.  This is true  irrespective 
of the measure  of deficit  or change  in government  considered. 
In table 10 we replicate  the probit  regressions  of table 9 but restrict 
the sample  to adjustment  years. In other  words, we include in the panel 
only country-years  in which the deficit change variable  assumes a neg- 
ative sign; the magnitudes  of the observed  deficit reductions  still vary. 
In all specifications,  the coefficient of the deficit variable  has a positive 
sign. In most cases, the coefficient is statistically  insignificant,  with the 
exception of the third  column, where it is significant.  The fact that the 
coefficient on the deficit is always positive indicates that, if anything, 
more radical adjustments  are associated with a lower probability  of a 
change in government.  When we run  this specification  for the subsam- 
ple of country-years  in which the deficit increases, the coefficients are 
insignificant. That is, there is no evidence that looser fiscal policies 
contribute  to political survival. 
53.  In particular,  we examine  the joint significance  of the economic variables  using 
a likelihood ratio test. At standard  confidence  levels, we find that we cannot  reject the 
hypothesis  that  growth  (AGDP) and  unemployment  growth  (AUNR)  are  jointly insignif- 
icant for either  ALLCH  or IDEOCH.  However, the hypothesis  that growth, unemploy- 
ment, and inflation  are  jointly insignificant  is strongly  rejected, whichever  indicator  of 
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Table 10. Probit Regressions  Predicting  Cabinet Changes, Sample of Adjustment 
Yearsa 
Independent  Dependent  variable 
variable  ALLCH  ALLCH  ALLCH  IDEOCH  IDEOCH  IDEOCH 
CHDEF  0.100  0.042 
(1.19)  (0.46) 
0.032  0.009 
COCHDEF  0.106  0.004 
(1.17)  (0.04) 
0.034  0.001 
TOTCHDEF  0.245  0.200 
(2.16)  (1.57) 
0.076  0.041 
AGDPb  -0.028  -0.014  -0.044  -0.073  -0.045  -0.043 
(-0.68)  (-0.35)  (-0.98)  (-  1.48)  (-0.95)  (-0.82) 
-0.009  -0.004  -0.014  -0.016  -0.010  -0.009 
AUNRb  0.003  0.006  -0.002  -0.003  -0.001  -0.002 
(0.59)  (1.31)  (-0.48)  (-0.48)  (-0.29)  (-0.26) 
0.001  0.002  -0.001  -0.001  -0.000  -0.000 
INFLb  0.035  0.038  0.042  0.026  0.018  0.022 
(2.11)  (2.17)  (2.45)  (1.43)  (0.91)  (1.15) 
0.011  0.012  0.013  0.006  0.004  0.004 
DURAT  0.196  0.186  0.088  0.158  0.188  0.164 
(2.42)  (2.35)  (1.08)  (1.75)  (2.16)  (1.81) 
0.064  0.060  0.027  0.034  0.004  0.033 
COAL  0.688  0.576  0.689  0.646  0.672  0.848 
(3.68)  (3.09)  (3.62)  (2.93)  (2.98)  (3.62) 
0.222  0.185  0.216  0.143  0.145  0.180 
MAJ  -0.284  -0.192  -0.436  -0.488  -0.445  -0.699 
(-  1.26)  (-0.87)  (-  1.94)  (-  1.90)  (-  1.71)  (-2.60) 
-0.096  -0.063  -0.146  -0.121  -0.106  -0.173 
Summary  statistic 
Log likelihood  -  155.93  -  159.54  -  154.00  -  115.78  -  115.53  -  110.93 
N  289  296  292  289  296  292 
Source: For sources of all data and explanations of all variables, see appendix A. 
a. Probit regressions include a constant. Panel is described in appendix A, but in this table is restricted to country-years 
in which the deficit-to-GDP ratio is reduced (CHDEF <  0).  Each set of entries includes the coefficient,  the t statistic (in 
parentheses), and the marginal effect of a one unit change in the regressor (evaluated at the means of all regressors). 
b. When TOTCHDEF is included as the deficit change variable, given variables are replaced by ATOTGDP, ATOTUNR, 
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Since  most of the large cases  of large fiscal adjustments occurred in 
the  1980s  and  1990s,  we  also  split the sample  into the periods  up to 
1974 and from 1975 onward. We find that changes in the deficit do not 
affect  chances  of  political  survival  in  either  subsample.  Moreover, 
when we consider only periods of adjustment, larger cuts in the deficit 
are associated  with political  survival when ALLCH is used.  This result 
is stronger for the period that starts in 1975. 
In table  11 we  examine  whether adjustments that rely primarily on 
spending cuts, particularly on government wages and transfers, decrease 
the probability of  government survival and find that they do not.  This 
table is organized similarly to table 9.  The first independent variable is 
contemporaneous change in the deficit (CHDEF). PEXP (defined in ap- 
pendix A) is equal to one for a given observation if it satisfies two criteria: 
the deficit-to-GDP ratio is cut by more than 1.5 percentage points,  and 
the cut in total public expenditures is larger than the median cut in expen- 
ditures for the sample of large adjustments (that is, deficit-to-GDP reduc- 
tions of at least 1.5 percentage points). The dummy variables PTRF and 
PCGW similarly isolate large reductions in transfer payments and in gov- 
ernment wage  consumption,  respectively.  With these dummy variables 
we  isolate large adjustments that rely mostly on spending cuts,  that is, 
those that are more likely to have a discernible effect on the well-being 
of the voters.  The results in table 11 offer no evidence  whatsoever that 
this type of  adjustment is  politically  costly.  All  of  the coefficients  are 
statistically insignificant, but the negative sign of the coefficients  when 
ALLCH is the dependent variable is consistent with a higher probability 
of government survival for large adjustments on the spending side. 
In summary,  the  regressions  described  in  this  section  provide  no 
evidence  that the probability of survival falls as cabinets pursue deficit- 
reducing  policies.  Rather,  we  find weak  evidence  that during  sharp 
adjustments that rely primarily on spending cuts in general,  and on the 
major components  of  government  wages  and transfers,  in particular, 
the probability of government  survival may even  increase. 
Fiscal Adjustments and the Popularity of the Government 
Politicians  are concerned about popularity and often change policies 
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Table 11. Adding Adjustment  Composition  Dummies to Regressions  Predicting 
Cabinet Changesa 
Independent  Dependent  variable 
variable  ALLCH  ALLCH  ALLCH  IDEOCH  IDEOCH  IDEOCH 
CHDEF  -0.041  -0.030  -0.036  -0.003  -0.006  -0.020 
(-0.98)  (-0.75)  (-0.92)  (-0.07)  (-0.14)  (-0.46) 
-0.013  -0.010  0.012  -0.001  -0.001  -0.004 
AGDP  -0.008  -0.008  -0.005  -0.026  -0.028  -0.025 
(-0.33)  (-0.30)  (-0.20)  (-0.86)  (-0.90)  (-0.82) 
-0.003  -0.002  -0.002  -0.006  -0.006  -0.005 
AUNR  0.003  0.003  0.003  0.001  0.002  0.001 
(1.17)  (1.05)  (1.08)  (0.45)  (0.56)  (0.44) 
0.001  0.001  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000 
INFL  0.029  0.029  0.029  0.026  0.025  0.026 
(2.62)  (2.63)  (2.56)  (2.06)  (2.01)  (2.03) 
0.010  0.010  0.001  0.006  0.006  0.006 
DURAT  0.190  0.186  0.192  0.226  0.228  0.230 
(3.38)  (3.32)  (3.41)  (3.61)  (3.65)  (3.66) 
0.062  0.061  0.063  0.049  0.049  0.050 
COAL  0.465  0.463  0.464  0.508  0.504  0.513 
(3.69)  (3.68)  (3.69)  (3.42)  (3.39)  (3.45) 
0.153  0.152  0.152  0.111  0.111  0.113 
MAJ  -0.257  -0.249  -0.254  -0.398  -0.399  -0.405 
(-1.79)  (-  1.74)  (-  1.77)  (-2.39)  (-2.41)  (-2.44) 
-0.087  -0.084  -0.086  -0.095  -0.095  -0.097 
PEXP  -0.232  0.147 
(-  1.16)  (0.68) 
-0.072  0.034 
PTRF  -0.128  0.142 
(-0.81)  (0.81) 
-0.041  0.032 
PCGW  -0.233  -0.060 
(-1.55)  (-0.35) 
-0.073  -0.013 
Summary  statistic 
Log likelihood  -  326.02  -  326.37  -  325.49  - 230.66  - 230.56  - 230.82 
N  583  583  583  583  583  583 
Source: For sources of all data and explanations of all variables, see appendix A. 
a. Probit regressions include a constant and use the panel of country-years described in appendix A. Each set of entries 
includes the coefficient, the t statistic (in parentheses), and the marginal  effect of a one unit change in the regressor (evaluated 
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relation  between fiscal adjustments  and  government  popularity,  as mea- 
sured  by opinion  polls. The difference  between  data  on popularity  polls 
and data on actual elections is that the former  are much more frequent 
and thus may capture voters' responses to fiscal adjustments  more 
quickly. 
Data 
Our data on popularity  come from a variety of sources. The main 
source is the European  Commission's Eurobarometer  survey, which 
asks a sample of citizens in each European  Union country a series of 
questions  concerning  political orientation.  For the present  purpose, the 
question of particular  interest is: "Which party would you vote for if 
general elections were held tomorrow?"  By aggregating  the response 
for the parties in and out of government,  we construct  a variable  mea- 
suring  the share  of total voters who would likely vote for the parties  in 
government,  if elections were held tomorrow.  For  Norway  and  Sweden, 
which joined the European  Community  in the middle of the sample 
period, and also for Australia, Canada,  and the United States, we use 
domestic sources that ask questions very similar to that in the Euro- 
barometer  survey. Thus we obtain a sample of sixteen countries  (Aus- 
tria, Finland, and Japan are omitted from our original sample) with 
yearly observations for the period 1975-93.  The variable POPCH is 
defined  as the year-to-year  change in government  popularity.54 
Results 
Table 12 reports  the correlation  matrix  for several variables  of inter- 
est. In order to correct for country-specific  effects, we present corre- 
lations between the residuals  of regressions  of each variable  on country 
dummies. The correlation  between change in the deficit and change in 
popularity  polls is positive. 
We then perform  regression analysis with POPCH on the left-hand 
side, and on the right-hand  side, the economic and institutional  varia- 
bles used in the probit regressions predicting cabinet changes. The 
results are presented  in table 13. We find no effects of deficit changes 
on change in government  popularity.  None of the other  economic var- 
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Table 12. Correlations  Among Deficit, Cabinet Change, and Popularity  Variablesa 
Correlation  coefficient 
CHDEF  COCHDEF  TOTCHDEF  TERM  ALLCH  PMCH  IDEOCH 
COCHDEF  0.96  1.00 
TOTCHDEF  0.79  0.75  1.00 
TERM  -0.29  -0.17  -0.04  1.00 
ALLCH  -0.30  -0.28  -0.03  0.83  1.00 
PMCH  -0.31  -0.30  -0.06  0.77  0.95  1.00 
IDEOCH  -0.16  -0.12  0.04  0.64  0.73  0.53  1.00 
POPCH  0.15  0.21  0.33  0.18  0.01  -0.12  0.37 
Source: For sources of all data and explanations of all variables, see appendix A. 
a. Panel includes sixteen countries-as  specified in the section on popularity data in appendix A-over  the period 
1975-93.  Correlations are among the residuals that result from regressing these variables on country dummies. 
iables  is  significant.  Various  sensitivity  analyses  and specification  tests 
do  not  alter  this  picture.  This  absence  of  evidence  that  government 
popularity  is  systematically  affected  by  changes  in the  deficit  is consis- 
tent  with  our  previous  findings. 
Causality 
Our results  thus  far can be  summarized  by the  statement  that govern- 
ment  collapses  are  not  significantly  more  probable  after  deficit  reduc- 
tions  or less  probable  after  deficit  increases.  This  finding  is open  to two 
different  interpretations.  The  first  is  that  electorates  are  fiscally  "re- 
sponsible,"  that  is,  they  do  not  like  excessive  deficits  and  understand 
that  fiscal  adjustments  are  sometimes  necessary.  As  a  consequence, 
such  electorates  do  not  punish  governments  that  cut  the  deficit.  The 
second  interpretation  is  that  voters  dislike  tax  increases  and  spending 
cuts,  but  the  cabinets  that  choose  to  implement  fiscal  adjustments  are 
so popular  on other  issues  that they  can afford  unpopular  fiscal  policies. 
In this  section  we  try to  discover  which  interpretation  is  more  likely. 
If  the  second  interpretation  were  correct,  governments  would  try  to 
"get  away"  with  fiscal  adjustments  at  the  beginning  of  their  terms. 
They  would  suffer  a temporary  loss  of  popularity,  but  would  recover 
in time  for the  next  election.  In a sense,  this  is a version  of  the political 
business  cycle  theory  of  William  Nordhaus,  according  to  which  gov- 
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Table  13. Regressions  Explaining  Government  Popularitya 
Independent 
variable 
CHDEF  -0.097 
(-0.38) 
COCHDEF  -0.264 
(-1.09) 
TOTCHDEF  -0.216 
(-0.78) 
AGDPb  0.229  0.244  0.282 
(0.94)  (1.00)  (1.00) 
AUNRb  0.009  0.013  0.028 
(0.28)  (0.39)  (0.84) 
INFLb  -0.061  -0.067  -0.056 
(-0.58)  (-0.66)  (-0.53) 
COAL  0.000  -0.001  -0.000 
(0.01)  (-0.05)  (-0.04) 
MAJ  -0.120  -0.120  -0.125 
(-1. 19)  (-1.20)  (-1.21) 
Summary  statistic 
R2  0.01  0.01  0.01 
N  259  259  259 
Source: For sources of all data and explanations of all variables, see appendix A. 
a. Dependent variable is POPCH, the percentage point change in government popularity (see appendix A). Regressions 
include a constant. Panel includes sixteen countries-as  specified in the section on popularity data in appendix A-over  the 
period 1975-93.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent t statistics are in parentheses. 
b. When TOTCHDEF  is included as the deficit change variable, given variables are replaced by ATOTGDP, ATOTUNR, 
and ATOTINFL,  as appropriate, and corresponding coefficients are reported. 
after they are reelected.55  This argument  has two implications  that can 
be tested empirically:  first, that fiscal contractions  tend to be concen- 
trated  at the beginning of a political term;  and second, that fiscal con- 
tractions  should  be followed by temporary  declines in the popularity  of 
the cabinet. 
The results in the previous section reject the second implication. In 
regard  to the first implication, in the first  line of table 14 we report  the 
average  tenure  for the whole sample, and for the subsample  of govern- 
ments whose tenures  include small or large adjustments.  The first row 
of table 14 shows no evidence that deficit cuts are concentrated  in the 
55.  Nordhaus (1975).  For an extensive discussion of  the related literature, see 
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Table 14. Average  Tenure  and Popularity  of Cabinets That Undertake  Fiscal 
Adjustmentsa 
Units as indicated 
Deficit  not cyclically  Deficit  cyclically 
corrected  corrected 
All  Small  Large  Small  Large 
Variable  observations  adjustmentsb adjustmentsc  adjustmentsb  adjustmentsc 
DURAT  1.99  2.04  1.89  1.96  1.93 
(0.07)  (0.12)  (0.13)  (0.12)  (0.30) 
POPLEVI  100  0.45  0.46  0.44  0.46  0.44 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02) 
Summary  statistic 
N  259  82  45  89  41 
Source: For sources of all data and explanations of all variables, see appendix A. 
a. Table gives means and standard  deviations (in parentheses) from a panel that includes sixteen countries-as  specified 
in the section on popularity data in appendix A-over  the period 1975-93. 
b. Panel restricted to country-years in which  -1.5  <  CHDEF (or COCHDEF) <  0. 
c.  Panel restricted to country-years in which CHDEF (or COCHDEF) '  -1.5. 
first year after a termination.  Although  the average  number  of years in 
office is lower for large adjustments  than for the whole sample, the 
difference is not significant. This is true whether  or not we correct  for 
the business cycle in the definitions  of adjustments.  Thus neither im- 
plication of the political business cycle argument  is verified in our 
sample. 
More broadly, if it is the case that only strong governments  imple- 
ment unpopular  fiscal adjustments,  they should do so when their pop- 
ularity  is particularly  high. However, there is no evidence that  govern- 
ment popularity is higher than average immediately before fiscal 
adjustments.  Table 14 shows that the average popularity  level for the 
whole sample is 44.5 percent, while the average popularity  at the be- 
ginning of calendar years with large adjustments  is actually slightly 
lower, at 44.4 percent. Average  popularity  is a little higher  than  for the 
whole sample immediately  before small fiscal adjustments  (46.3 per- 
cent).56  The results are similar  for both uncorrected  and cyclically cor- 
rected measures  of the deficit. 
56.  There  are two reasons  why all of these values are below 50 percent.  First, all of 
our popularity  data  refer  to the period 1975-93, when several  OECD  countries  had  quite 
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Another  way to address  the issue of causality is to consider adjust- 
ments  when the timing is not chosen by the cabinet;  that  is, adjustments 
that are unavoidable  given the circumstances.  In table 15 we estimate 
the reaction to such exogenous adjustments  by instrumenting  for the 
change in the deficit. We use as instruments  for the change in deficit 
the short-  and  long-term  real interest  rates, the debt-to-GDP  ratio  at the 
beginning of the year, the change in the debt-to-GDP  ratio in the three 
years before the observation, and the average growth of real GDP in 
the G7 countries. These instruments  are, for the most part, significant 
and display the expected signs in explaining change in the deficit. 
As often is the case, the choice of instruments  is problematic  and 
imperfect. Therefore  the results of this exercise should be taken with 
caution. The real interest  rates and the average growth  rate for the G7 
countries  probably  do not directly affect popularity,  but may indicate 
times when it is easier (or more urgent)  to reduce  the deficits. Average 
G7 growth is correlated  with the growth rates of individual  countries, 
but as discussed above, the latter  is not highly correlated  with govern- 
ment popularity  or survival, except in the United States. The level and 
growth  of the national  debt indicate the necessity to engage in a fiscal 
adjustment,  but  are  unlikely  to affect the survival  of the cabinet  directly. 
As before, changes in the deficit do not significantly  affect the govern- 
ment's chances of survival. The patterns  and statistical significance  of 
all the other coefficients are similar to those in the probit regressions 
above. 
Another, potentially  fruitful, way to address  exogeneity is to inves- 
tigate the effect on government  survival of fiscal adjustments  imposed 
on a country  by outside authorities.  Obvious examples are the adjust- 
ments imposed by the convergence  criteria  for the European  Monetary 
Union under  the Maastricht  treaty. It would be interesting  to examine 
whether  voters react differently to fiscal policies imposed by interna- 
tional constraints  than to those chosen independently  by their national 
governments.  Casual observation  suggests that the response to the ef- 
fects of the Maastrich  treaty has been varied. In Italy very large tax 
increases, some of them explicitly targeted  to monetary  union (such as 
dents who say that  they intend  to vote for one of the parties  in the cabinet. But many  of 
the cabinets in the sample are minority  cabinets, while some of the majority  cabinets 
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Table 15. Probit Regressions  Predicting  Cabinet Changes, Instrumental  Variable 
Estimationa 
Independent  Dependent variable 
variable  ALLCH  IDEOCH 
CHDEF  -0.079  -0.011 
(-0.55)  (-0.07) 
-0.026  -0.002 
AGDP  -0.023  -0.037 
(-0.66)  (-0.90) 
-0.007  -0.008 
AUNR  0.001  0.001 
(0.38)  (0.30) 
0.000  0.000 
INFL  0.050  0.038 
(2.98)  (1.980) 
0.016  0.008 
DURAT  0.172  0.197 
(2.55)  (2.54) 
0.056  0.041 
COAL  0.178  0.356 
(1.18)  (1.97) 
0.058  0.074 
MAJ  -0.274  -0.382 
(-  1.58)  (-1.88) 
-0.093  -0.088 
Summary statistic 
Log likelihood  - 206.37  -  140.27 
N  369  369 
Source: For sources of all data and explanations of all variables, see appendix A. 
a.  Probit regressions include a constant and use the panel of country-years described in appendix A. Each set of entries 
includes the coefficient, the t statistic (in parentheses , and the marginal  effect of a one unit change in the regressor (evaluated 
at the means of all regressors . CHDEF is instrumented using RINTRT,  DEBT, CHDEBT, and AGDPG7. In the first stage 
regression,R2  =  0.10. 
"the Europe  tax"), have been accepted  relatively  easily by the public.57 
In France, by contrast, the conservative  government's  attempt  to trim 
the welfare state during 1995-97 generated  riots and cost it reelection. 
When we try to determine whether the response of electorates in 
European  Union countries  to fiscal adjustments  in the 1980s and 1990s 
is different from their responses to other adjustments,  we find the evi- 
57.  It should  be added,  however, that  Italian  fiscal adjustments  have largely  avoided 
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dence inconclusive. There  are some problems  with this approach,  how- 
ever. First, it is not always clear which policies are induced by the 
Maastricht  treaty  and  which are  not, especially as one goes further  back 
in time. Second, since in recent years the decision to reduce deficits 
has essentially been identified with the decision to join the European 
Monetary  Union, it is not clear to what extent Maastricht  adjustments 
are truly exogenous. 
Concluding Comments 
Fiscal adjustments  do not always cause recessions. On the contrary, 
fiscal consolidations  prompted  by a fiscal crisis and achieved by trim- 
ming government  spending often have expansionary  effects. Further- 
more, governments  do not seem to be systematically punished at the 
ballot box for engaging in fiscal adjustments,  nor do they loose popu- 
larity, as measured  by opinion polls. In principle, one can think  of two 
explanations  for this result. One is that voters do not like fiscal profli- 
gacy. The other  is that  governments  are  particularly  skillful at choosing 
the appropriate  moments to implement  unpopular  policies. While it is 
difficult to decide  definitively,  we conclude  in favor of the first 
interpretation. 
If it is true that fiscal adjustments  do not imply high political costs, 
why are they so politically charged  and difficult?  One possible answer 
is that successful fiscal adjustments  imply cuts in public wages and in 
transfers, including social security, directly affecting two constituen- 
cies that are very powerful in many countries:  public sector employees 
and pensioners. 
For demographic  reasons, and because of the generosity of many 
public pension schemes, pensioners today are more numerous,  longer 
lived, and  wealthier  than  a couple of decades ago, and  they have ample 
time to engage in political action. In many countries, pensioners rep- 
resent  a large fraction  of union members.  Therefore,  as a constituency, 
pensioners have political influence beyond their share in the voting 
population.  Indeed, the political influence  of the union movement  goes 
well beyond the fact that its members  are voters. The approval  of the 
unions is sought  before any fiscal maneuver  is approved  and implemen- 
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navian countries, and to some extent, Germany.  Moreover, the union 
movement has recourse to forms of political action, such as general 
strikes, that can have serious sociopolitical consequences. Our  results 
indicate, however, that governments  that are willing to "bite the bul- 
let"  and persist in certain types of fiscal adjustment,  despite union 
opposition, are not systematically  punished  at the ballot box. 
Another-not  mutually  exclusive-explanation  could be "political 
risk aversion."  If politicians are unsure about the electoral conse- 
quences of a decisive fiscal adjustment,  they might prefer  not to "rock 
the boat" unless absolutely necessary, for example, because of fiscal 
stress. In other words, the political uncertainty  associated with fiscal 
adjustments  may deter policymakers  from pursuing  them more often, 
particularly  in election years. 
APPENDIX  A 
Data 
OUR  SAMPLE PERIODS are 1960-95 for the fiscal and  cabinet  change  data 
and 1975-93 for the popularity  data.  The data  set includes  the following 
OECD  countries:  Australia,  Austria, Belgium, Canada,  Denmark,  Fin- 
land, France,  Germany,  Greece, Ireland,  Italy, Japan,  the Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal,  Spain, Sweden, the United  Kingdom,  and  the United 
States. Note that Greece, Spain, and Portugal  are covered only from 
the mid-1970s, when they became pluralist  democracies. 
Cabinet Data 
For the period 1960-95,  cabinet data are from Budge, Keman, and 
Woldendorp  (1993) and subsequent  updates. For 1995 data, we use 
Banks and others (1996). We assemble data for Greece, Portugal, and 
Spain from Banks and others (1996), in accordance  with the criteria 
used by Budge, Keman, and  Woldendorp  (1993), since the latter  do not 
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Given that the main interest  of the paper  is the electoral response to 
fiscal adjustment,  the relevant  electoral  period is moved forward  half a 
year relative to the fiscal data. For example, cabinet terminations  and 
changes designated "1993"  correspond  to changes that occurred  be- 
tween July 1, 1993 and June 30,  1994. When more than one cabinet 
termination  or change occurs in a given year, we apply the following 
rules: 
-If  there was no termination  during  the previous year, the incum- 
bent cabinet has the same characteristics  as the cabinet that was in 
power the previous year. 
-If  there was a termination  during  the year before and an election 
this year, the cabinet that faced the election is considered  the cabinet 
of this year and the election is the reason for its termination. 
-If  there  was a termination  the year  before  but  there  was no election 
this year, we take the longest lasting cabinet  of this year and  the reason 
for its termination. 
The cabinet variables  are defined as follows: 
DURAT  Duration:  integer  number  of years  that  a cabinet  has been 
in power, up to the current  year. A cabinet that falls 
during  its first year in power is counted as 1; the maxi- 
mum tenure  in the sample is 5. 
SING  Single party:  dummy  variable  equal to 1 if a single party 
cabinet is in power. 
COAL  Coalition:  dummy  variable  equal to 1 if a coalition cab- 
inet-that  is, including  ministers  from two or more  par- 
ties-is  in power. 
MAJ  Majority:  dummy variable  equal to 1 if the cabinet has 
majority  support  in parliament.  Majority  cabinets may 
be single party, minimal winning coalitions, or surplus 
coalitions; the second and third  types imply an overlap 
of MAJ and COAL. 
TERM  Government  termination:  dummy  variable  equal to 1 in 
any year in which a government  ends, regardless  of the 
reason.  A termination  may or may not  involve  a 
"change" in cabinet ideology or prime minister. 
IDEOCH  Change  in ideology of cabinet:  dummy  variable  equal to 
1 if there is a change in the ideology index between the 
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cabinet on a right-left scale, as follows: 1 indicates that 
the share of right-wing parties in government-or  of 
supporting  parties  in parliament,  in cases where parties 
explicitly support  a cabinet without holding office-is 
equal to or greater  than two-thirds;  2 indicates that the 
shares  of right and center  parties  are each between one- 
third and two-thirds; 3 indicates that the share of the 
center parties is larger than one-half, or that left- and 
right-wing  parties  form a government  with neither  dom- 
inant; 4 and 5 correspond  to 1 and 2 in favor of left- 
wing parties. For the United States, a Democrat  presi- 
dent is classified as 5, and a Republican  as 1. 
PMCH  Change  of prime minister:  dummy  equal to 1 if there is 
a change of prime  minister  (or president,  for the United 
States). 
ALLCH  Change  of ideology or prime minister:  dummy  variable 
equal to 1 if either  IDEOCH  or PMCH  is equal to 1. 
RIGHT  Right-wing cabinet: dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
cabinet in power scores 1 or 2 on the ideology index 
described  under  IDEOCH. 
CENTER  Cabinet  at center  of political spectrum:  dummy  variable 
equal  to 1 if the cabinet  in power  scores 3 on the ideology 
index described  under  IDEOCH. 
LEFT  Left-wing cabinet: dummy variable equal to  1 if the 
cabinet in power scores 4 or 5 on the ideology index 
described  under  IDEOCH. 
Popularity Data 
We have popularity  data for sixteen countries-that  is, those listed 
above excluding Austria, Finland, and Japan-over  the period 1975- 
93. For countries in the European  Union, our main source is the Eu- 
ropean  Commission's Eurobarometer,  various issues; data for Greece 
are available from 1979, and for Portugal  and Spain, from 1986. Ex- 
ceptions are data on Sweden, which are from SIFO  Research  and Con- 
sulting, as provided  by the Swedish Social Science Data Service, Go- 
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and  Opinion  A/S (from 1989), as provided  by Norwegian  Social Science 
Data  Service, Bergen. Data  for Australia  are  from  the Australian  Gallup 
poll, as provided  by the Australian  National University in Canada;  for 
Canada, from the Canadian  Institute of Public Opinion and Insight 
Canada Research (for 1992 and 1993), as provided by the Carleton 
University  Library  Data  Centre,  Ottawa;  and  for the United  States, from 
the Gallup Organization's  Gallup Monthly  Poll, August 1995. 
Change in popularity  is constructed  as follows. For each country- 
year, we note which parties  were represented  in the cabinet, consistent 
with the cabinet  data  explained  above. We then  compute  the percentage 
of respondents  who said that they would vote for one of the parties in 
the cabinet, if elections were held soon (poll questions are almost al- 
ways phrased in terms of elections to be held today or tomorrow). 
Virtually all of the surveys chosen as sources of popularity  data are 
collected in November and December. Thus we can use change in 
popularity  to measure  the response to fiscal policy pursued  within the 
calendar  year. 
The popularity  variables  are defined as follows: 
POPLEV  Level of popularity of parties represented  in cabinet: 
percentage  of respondents  expressing  support  for one of 
the parties  in cabinet  at the end of the calendar  year. For 
a given year, the cabinet is the same as that used to 
compute IDEOCH and ALLCH. 
POPCH  Change in popularity  of the parties  represented  in cabi- 
net: change in the popularity  level during  the calendar 
year. If the governing  party  or coalition  changes  between 
time  t-  1  and time  t,  the POPCH  assigned  to  t is  the 
change in popularity  of the party  in power at time t. 
National Accounts Data 
Aggregate macroeconomic  data, and fiscal data, in particular,  are 
taken  from  Organisation  for Economic  Co-operation  and  Development, 
Economic  Outlook,  1997.  They cover the period  1960-95.  These eco- 
nomic variables  are defined as follows: 
CHDEF  Change in deficit: percentage  point change in the ratio 
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CHEXP  Change  in public expenditures:  percentage  point change 
in the ratio of primary  expenditures  to GDP. 
CHREV  Change in public revenues: percentage  point change in 
the ratio of public revenues to GDP. 
CHTRF  Change  in transfers:  percentage  point  change  in the ratio 
of transfers  to GDP. 
CHSUB  Change  in subsidies:  percentage  point  change  in the ratio 
of subsidies to GDP. 
CHCGW  Change in government  wages: percentage  point change 
in the ratio of government  wages to GDP. 
CHCGNW  Change in government  expenditures  other than wages: 
percentage  point change in the ratio of public expendi- 
tures excluding government  wages to GDP. 
CHINV  Change in public investment:  percentage  point change 
in the ratio of public investment  to GDP. 
COCHEXP  Change in government expenditures (CHEXP), cor- 
rected for the cycle. 
COCHREV  Change in public revenues (CHREV),  corrected  for the 
cycle. 
COCHDEF  Change in the primary  deficit (CHDEF), corrected  for 
the cycle: calculated  as COCHEXP  less COCHREV. 
TOTCHDEF Average change in deficit during tenure: average per- 
centage point change in the deficit over the years that 
the current  cabinet has been in power, up to the current 
year. That is, the average  of CHDEF  for the years from 
the last termination  up to the current  year. 
DEBT  Public debt: public debt as a percentage  of GDP at the 
beginning of the fiscal year. 
CHDEBT  Change  in public  debt:  percentage  point  change  in DEBT 
over the past three years (t -  3 to t). 
AGDP  Rate of growth of real GDP, percent. 
ATOTGDP  Average  growth  during  tenure:  average  growth  rate  from 
the time when a cabinet came to power, up to current 
year, percent. 
AGDPG7  Growth  of G7 countries:  weighted average growth rate 
of the G7 countries, percent. 
AGDPg7  Growth  relative  to the G7 countries:  calculated  as AGDP 
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UNR  Unemployment  rate, percent. 
AUNR  Growth  of the unemployment  rate, percent: 
(UNRtIUNRtl-  1)  x  100. 
ATOTUNR  Average unemployment  growth during tenure:  average 
annual growth rate of unemployment  rate from begin- 
ning of cabinet's tenure  to current  year, percent. 
UNRg7  Unemployment  rate relative to the G7 countries:  unem- 
ployment  rate less the GDP-weighted  average  of the G7 
unemployment  rate, percentage  points. 
INFL  Inflation:  rate of change of the GDP deflator,  percent. 
TOTINFL  Average inflation  during  tenure:  average  rate  of inflation 
from the beginning of cabinet's tenure  to current  year, 
percent. 
PEXP  Spending-based  adjustment:  dummy  variable  equal to 1 
when following two conditions hold: first, there is a 
large  adjustment  (CHDEF  '  -1.5);  and second, 
CHEXP  is less than its median  across all years in which 
a large adjustment  occurs. 
PTRF  Transfer-based  adjustment:  dummy variable equal to 1 
when following two conditions hold: first, there is a 
large  adjustment  (CHDEF  '  -  1.5);  and  second, 
CHTRF  is less than its median  across all years in which 
a large adjustment  occurs. 
PCGW  Government  wage-based adjustment:  dummy variable 
equal to 1 when the following two conditions  hold: first, 
there is a large adjustment (CHDEF  '  -  1.5); and sec- 
ond, CHCGW  is less than its median  across all years in 
which a large adjustment  occurs. 
AINV  Investment  growth:  rate of growth of real private  busi- 
ness investment, percent. 
ACONS  Consumption  growth:  rate  of growth  of real private  con- 
sumption, percent. 
NINTRTg7  Relative nominal  interest  rate:  long nominal  interest  rate 
(ten-year treasury notes) of  a given country less  the 
GDP-weighted  average  of long nominal  interest  rates in 
the G7 countries, percentage  points. 
RINTRT  Real interest  rate:  ten-year  interest  rate  minus  the growth 
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RINTRTg7  Relative real interest  rate:  ten-year  real interest  rate  of a 
given country less the GDP-weighted average of real 
interest  rates in the G7 countries. 
AEFXCHRT Rate of change of effective exchange rate, percent. A 
positive value indicates appreciation. 
TB  Trade  balance:  the trade  balance  as a percentage  of GDP. 
AULC  Growth  of unit labor costs: rate of growth  of unit labor 
costs in manufacturing,  percent. 
AVAULC  Rate of growth of the ratio of the value-added  deflator 
for manufactured  exports  to the unit labor  cost, percent. 
PSH  Profit  share:  profits  as a percentage  of total income. 
Cyclical Adjustment 
Our  methodology  follows Blanchard  (1990b). For  each country,  total 
primary  expenditures  and total revenues are corrected  for the cycle by 
running  OLS regressions of spending  and revenues, respectively, on a 
constant, a time trend for the period 1960-75,  a time trend for the 
period 1976-93 period, and the unemployment  rate: 
EXP, =  oto  +  otI  (TREND6075)  +  ?t2  (TREND7693)  +  ot3 (UNR), +  E, 
REV, =  O  + PI  (TREND6075)  +  12 (TREND7693)  +  P3 (UNR), +  E. 
We then compute the cyclically adjusted  aggregates  as the original 
aggregate  less the estimated  coefficient on the unemployment  rate  times 
the change in the unemployment  rate: 
COCHEXPt  =  CHEXP,  -  0L3 (UNRt  -  t_), 
COCHREVt  =  CHREV,-  _3  (UNRt  -  UNR,t1). 
These aggregates  attempt  to measure  the levels of public  expenditure 
and revenue that would have prevailed had the unemployment  rate 
not changed relative to the previous year. This procedure corrects 
for change in fiscal policy due to short-run  fluctuations  and approxi- 
mates to policymakers' choices of spending and revenue levels. The 
difference  between  cyclically  corrected changes  in  expenditures 
(COCHEXP)  and in revenues (COCHREV)  is the cyclically corrected 
change in the fiscal deficit (COCHDEF). Comments 
and Discussion 
Maurice Obstfeld: This is the latest in a series of illuminating  papers 
by Alesina, Perotti, and several coauthors.  The research  has advanced 
the understanding  of fiscal adjustment  by focusing on the composition 
of fiscal changes. Are taxes raised or are government  outlays cut? And 
in the latter case, do cuts fall on government  investment  or on public 
sector wages and  transfer  payments?  The basic message is that  in judg- 
ing the durability  of a fiscal adjustment  and its effects, the devil is in 
the details. 
The present paper combines two strands  of the literature  on fiscal 
adjustment.  First, it builds on the pioneering work on expansionary 
fiscal consolidation  initiated  by Francesco  Giavazzi and  Marco  Pagano 
in 1990. These authors  look closely at the 1987-89 Irish stabilization 
and the 1983-86  Danish stabilization  and find that those adjustments 
seemed to have had expansionary  rather  than contractionary  effects.  ' 
The other strand of literature  is the work by Alesina and Perotti 
themselves, beginning with their 1995 paper relating the success of 
fiscal consolidation to its detailed composition.2  I should warn at the 
outset-as  the authors  have done explicitly-that  in this paper  and its 
predecessors  they use a short-term  definition  of success, which revisits 
the fiscal scene only once, rather  shortly after a stabilization, to check 
for durability.  One sees a success in the data followed by another  five 
years  later, and  one is left wondering  how successful the first  "success" 
really could have been. 
1. Giavazzi and Pagano  (1990). 
2.  Alesina and Perotti  (1995). 
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Keeping  in mind this caveat,  however,  Alesina,  Perotti,  and their 
collaborators  have  suggested  some  striking results.  Reductions  in the 
government  wage  bill  and in transfer payments seem to guarantee rel- 
atively durable fiscal consolidation,  whereas tax hikes and cuts in gov- 
ernment investment  apparently are reversed  more quickly.  They  con- 
jecture  that durability  is  related  to  the  greater political  difficulty  in 
achieving  cuts  in government  wage  spending  and transfers compared 
with, say, letting infrastructure deteriorate for a while.  The former type 
of budgetary change requires a degree of political courage or consensus 
that  appears  to  be  associated  with  longer  lasting  fiscal  restraint.  In 
further work, these authors have examined the economic  effects of fiscal 
shifts.  Their headline  finding is that durable fiscal adjustments do not 
seem to dampen economic  growth, whereas adjustments based primar- 
ily on higher taxes or public investment  cuts do. 
In their 1995 paper Alesina  and Perotti raised,  but did not address, 
the question  of whether governments  are punished for cutting govern- 
ment wages or transfer payments.  The main contribution of the present 
paper is to take up this issue.  The answer that comes out of the analysis 
is  no.  The  authors propose  that voters  may really  be fiscal  conserva- 
tives.  A government need only bite the bullet to get its fiscal house in 
order; it will not be punished,  growth will not suffer,  and the economy 
will be on a better footing thereafter. From the politician's  perspective, 
the gain comes  with little or no pain. 
The view  that the composition  of fiscal adjustment matters for sus- 
tainability  has already been  quite influential.  The European Commis- 
sion's  Convergence Report, which,  only two days before this paper was 
presented,  nominated  the  initial  entrants to  European economic  and 
monetary union,  states: 
There  is ample  evidence that  both the size and composition  of budgetary 
adjustments  are important  in determining  whether  they will be successful 
in having a durable impact on the government's position and thus in 
shifting the government debt ratio onto a declining path. Large and 
persistent  adjustment  efforts tend to be more successful, and deficit re- 
ductions which take place through  cuts in current  primary  expenditure 
rather  than tax increases are less likely to be reversed in the future. 
Budgetary  adjustments  strongly  based on cuts in current  primary  expen- 
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a clear sign of the government's  commitment  to budgetary  discipline and 
of its determination  to maintain  these efforts in the future.3 
While there is some consensus on the factors that might promote a 
degree of durability,  the national  political ramifications  of alternative 
strategies for budgetary  adjustment  have not been systematically ex- 
plored  until the current  paper. Plainly, these too could be critical  to the 
performance  of EMU. 
The first part  of the paper  deals with the contrast  between contrac- 
tionary  and expansionary  fiscal adjustments,  reviewing several models 
and  mechanisms.  Early  literature  in this area  concentrated  on the private 
consumption  response  to different  types of fiscal shifts. When  one looks 
at the data for a large sample of OECD stabilizations, as Alesina and 
Perotti have done elsewhere and as this paper does in table 4,  other 
regularities  stand out.4 Most important,  much of the action takes place 
in investment  rather  than  in consumption.  In addition, successful fiscal 
adjustments  seem to coincide with rises in the share  of profits  in income. 
Unit labor costs fall during adjustments.  The authors hypothesize 
that when a government  cuts its wage bill, there is a reduction in the 
demand  for labor, which, in a heavily unionized labor market, leads 
quickly to a lower unit labor  cost. One could point to additional  mech- 
anisms that work in this direction. For example, lower transfer  pay- 
ments could intensify job search efforts by the unemployed, also low- 
ering the bargaining  power of employed workers. 
Other regularities are evident in the data, however, suggesting an 
alternative  view of successful adjustments:  perhaps successful fiscal 
adjustments  occur after  the economy has deteriorated  to the point where 
there  is political support  for the government  to make  tough choices and 
make the consolidation stick. In this case, the pain of the adjustments 
and  the permanence  of the fiscal improvement  are driven  by a common 
factor:  a preexisting state of crisis (or at least, malaise). 
While unit labor costs fall during successful adjustment  years, a 
striking  regularity  in table 4 is that they fall even more rapidly imme- 
diately before  those adjustment  years, and  they rise rather  dramatically 
3.  European  Commission  (1998, p. 105). This report  was issued on March  25, 1998. 
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just afterward.5  The reason for the large pre-adjustment  unit labor cost 
decline may well be that  money wages are sticky and  the exchange rate 
is falling more sharply  before successful adjustments  than it is before 
unsuccessful  ones. Rather  than  the labor  market  adjustments  the authors 
stress, an overshooting currency  depreciation  that is subsequently  re- 
versed may explain much of the dynamic pattern  that unit labor costs 
follow. Moreover,  both before and throughout  the adjustment  process, 
countries  that consolidate durably  tend to have higher shares  of wages 
in GDP and lower shares of profits. As a result of the successful ad- 
justments, these relatively  high wage shares  decline somewhat, and  the 
profit shares  rise. 
One therefore has the following picture of the economy before a 
successful adjustment.  Productivity-adjusted  nominal  wages are  unusu- 
ally high, compared  with those of trading partners.  The economy is 
uncompetitive. Investment  is low,  in part because the profit share is 
depressed. The wage share is correspondingly  high, and the currency 
is in a tailspin. Overall, the economy is in crisis and there is public 
support  for a stern consolidation. Certainly, the Irish and Danish sta- 
bilizations studied  by Giavazzi and Pagano fit this mold. 
As the authors  recognize, the full story of how an adjustment  takes 
place, why it is successful, and  why it (perhaps)  has the voters' support, 
requires consideration  of the total policy package deployed and the 
preexisting  economic and  political situation  from  which those measures 
arise. Their basic finding about political change following an adjust- 
ment is that there is no evidence of political retribution  for fiscal ad- 
justments. Indeed, there is some evidence that tougher  adjustments- 
that is, on wages and transfers-may  be rewarded. 
A striking by-product  of the econometrics is that growth rates of 
unemployment  and output  do not seem to affect electoral  outcomes. As 
the authors  point out, this is not the case in U.S. data. The discrepancy 
raises a puzzle for future  research.  Are the more  extensive social safety 
nets in European countries responsible for voter complacency? Are 
effects  masked by the dominant structural  component of European 
unemployment?  The variable that does matter is inflation. This fact 
reinforces my suspicion that rapid currency  depreciation  supports  de- 
termined  fiscal stabilization  by causing widespread  public alarm. 
5.  This pattern  differs  from the one reported  in Alesina and  Perotti  (1997a, table 10) 
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The authors  define a change in government  or a change in the ide- 
ology of a cabinet in various ways. As they admit, however, it is hard 
to handle the variety of electoral events that could be significant. For 
example, the outcome of the 1994 U.S. congressional  elections in part 
reflected voters' revenge for earlier tax hikes. Since that election did 
not change the executive, though, it would not appear  in the authors' 
sample of political changes. In a related vein, how would one handle 
by-elections that reduce the government's  majority, or local elections 
that send signals of voter discontent?  The authors  draw on popularity 
polls to address this point, but the reliability of these polls may be 
suspect. Former  president  George Bush's self-reassuring  observation 
that "the only poll that matters  is the one on Election Day" contains a 
grain of truth. 
A general concern in detecting fiscal events is the possibility of big 
fiscal changes that do not have short-run  effects on the budget. For 
example, changing an entitlement  program  or the inflation indexation 
of benefits might only affect deficits after some time and might not 
produce  any noticeable short-run  effect on transfer  payments, but vot- 
ers' anger could be aroused immediately. A related point is that the 
deficit numbers  may misstate the true intergenerational  redistribution 
effects of policies. It would be interesting  to perform  this paper's ex- 
ercise from a generational  accounting  perspective. 
I also worry about the counterfactual  in thinking  about  the political 
response to fiscal changes. An important  finding of this paper is that 
governments  are  not rewarded  for deficits. But perhaps  they would have 
been punished for not raising spending or for not instituting certain 
support  programs.  The question  of causality  is central  to drawing  policy 
implications from the empirical results on political sequelae. If suc- 
cessful adjustments  largely occur in crisis situations, and voters favor 
resolution  of the crisis, the government  will not be punished  if its efforts 
at consolidation  succeed. But the crisis has to be there first  and is itself 
related  to earlier  policies. 
The authors  suggest that voters might be fiscal conservatives. I find 
this much more plausible at the local than at the national  level. At the 
national  level, there are too many "others" onto whom the burden  of 
public spending  can be shifted. The French  have shown at the polls that 
they surely are not fiscal conservatives in this sense, no matter  who 
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I also suspect  the authors  are  too sanguine  about  how straightforward 
it is to rectify a fiscal imbalance.  It may be that  biting the bullet works, 
but only after a country  has entered  a crisis severe enough to command 
public support  for general sacrifice. Looking at the recent experience 
in Europe, one would think that the Maastricht  macroeconomic  con- 
vergence process would have provided  a great  opportunity  for govern- 
ments to bite the bullet and  make  truly  fundamental  fiscal reforms.  And 
if European  voters are fiscal conservatives at heart, this should have 
been all the more easy. But one does not see this from the data on the 
composition  of recent  fiscal adjustments,  notwithstanding  the European 
Commission's protestations  to the contrary. There are some cuts in 
government  wages and  transfers,  but most of the adjustments-leaving 
aside the countries  that had escaped "excessive deficit" status  prior  to 
1998-have  come through revenue increases, delayed infrastructure 
maintenance,  lower interest  on public debt due to expected interest  rate 
convergence, and the like.6 
To sum up, I view this as a stimulating  and important  line of work. 
I look forward  to more  of it, and  especially to more  case studies, which 
might prove to be a better calibrated  instrument  for understanding  the 
political ramifications  of fiscal cuts. The paper's implications for the 
design of fiscal policies are important.  One clear application  is to the 
EMU stability  pact, which seeks to limit fiscal deficits in member  states 
to 3 percent  of GDP through  the threat  of sanctions. The stability pact 
does not deal with the roots of fiscal problems, but rather  with their 
symptoms, and its focus on the deficit as a measure  of fiscal pressure 
is too blunt. True, the worst fiscal excesses of the past in Europe  will 
not reappear  soon. But the current  design of fiscal coordination  in EMU 
does little to prevent  government  deficits  from  approaching  the statutory 
reference maximum  too often for comfort. Thus the stability pact sets 
the stage for potentially serious political divisions among member 
states. From  that  perspective,  the author's  findings  should  be especially 
sobering  for Europeans.  If politicians  buy  the message  that  serious  fiscal 
reform  comes without  political cost, act accordingly, and indeed come 
up winners, excessive deficit situations  will be infrequent.  But for the 
big players in EMU, in the near term, that scenario seems overopti- 
mistic. 
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Barry Eichengreen: This is  a fitting paper to mark the Brookings 
Panel's celebration  of the elimination  of the U.S. budget  deficit. There 
have been not a few Brookings Papers  analyzing the effects of budget 
deficits on the U.S. economy.1 Now the deficit is finally a thing of the 
past, and discussion has turned  to the best way to utilize the surplus. 
Controversy  remains  about  the extent to which the economic initiatives 
taken by the first Clinton administration  and the 103d Congress have 
contributed  to closing the fiscal gap, as against  the unusually  persistent 
economic expansion that has dominated the 1990s-and  which may 
have occurred  for largely independent  reasons, including some ema- 
nating from a building four blocks due west of the White House. Ac- 
cording  to the administration's  estimates, only $103 billion of the $280 
billion decline in the budget deficit between 1992 and 1998 is due to 
improvement  in the economy, while the rest is due to fiscal policy 
changes.2 The question is whether those supposedly  autonomous 
changes-welfare  reform, for example-  really are independent  of the 
cycle, or they will be rolled back when the next recession hits, and the 
states will again appear  on the federal  doorstep, pleading  for help with 
their  welfare programs.  The debate  will continue, more intensely as the 
electoral season approaches.  Alesina, Perotti, and Tavares perform  a 
service by reminding  one that the variability  in cross-country  data can 
be quite useful for answering  such questions. 
This is also an appropriate  paper  with which to celebrate these au- 
thors' previous contributions  to the literature  on fiscal policy.  It is 
standard  nowadays  to distinguish  fiscal contractions  from fiscal consol- 
idations and to give credence to the idea that reductions in budget 
deficits can be expansionary  under certain  circumstances.  For this in- 
sight one has the authors  and their collaborators  to thank. 
Their  point is that  reductions  in budget  deficits can be expansionary, 
even in the short  run, if those reductions  are large, enduring,  and take 
the form of spending  cuts on transfer  payments  and public sector sala- 
ries, in particular.  This type of deficit reduction  can have a large posi- 
tive effect on consumer  confidence  and investment  spending. Denmark 
and Ireland  in the 1980s have been identified  as examples, and subse- 
1.  Economic historians will remember  Teeters (1972); Perry (1975); Friedman 
(1978); Hubbard  and Judd  (1986). 
2.  Budget  of  the  United  States  Government,  Analytical  Perspectives,  Fiscal  Year 
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quent work, extended and consolidated here, suggests that this result 
carries  over to a larger  sample of countries. 
The obvious objection is on grounds of simultaneity  bias. By the 
authors'  argument,  deficit reductions-or  more  precisely, certain  kinds 
of deficit reductions-raise  the rate of economic growth. But one also 
knows that faster growth favorably  affects the deficit. A common aca- 
demic game is to take a supposed instance of expansionary  fiscal con- 
traction and argue that the economy was in fact stimulated  by some 
omitted variable  that  raised output  and induced  the observed  fall in the 
budget deficit. For Denmark  and Ireland in the 1980s, for example, 
analysts argue that fiscal consolidation occurred  during the period of 
the soaring U.S.  dollar;  the favorable  competitiveness  effects of these 
countries'  depreciating  real exchange  rates  therefore  swamped  the neg- 
ative output effects of the contractionary  fiscal impulse. The authors 
are aware of this problem, and they attempt  to it solve by cyclically 
adjusting  the deficit. But the one thing economists know about  cyclical 
adjustments  is that we do not know how to do them: we do not know 
whether  business cycles are symmetric, we do not know whether  they 
are alike, we do not know the size of the unit-root  component. 
Note, also, that while the authors  correct  the deficit (as well as total 
primary  expenditures  and  total revenues)  for the cycle, table 3 compar- 
ing changes in the composition of expenditure  between sustained  and 
transitory (that is,  "successful"  and "unsuccessful") fiscal adjust- 
ments relies on cyclically uncorrected  figures. During a sustained  ad- 
justment, according  to this table, a good deal of the spending  reduction 
comes out of transfers.  But this is the subcategory  of public spending 
that is likely to be particularly  sensitive to the cycle.  An alternative 
interpretation,  therefore, is that when there is a sustained  acceleration 
in growth  for reasons  having little to do with fiscal policy, much of the 
induced reduction  in the deficit takes the form of a fall in government 
transfers. Convincing skeptical readers will  thus require sensitivity 
analysis using alternative  cyclical corrections and correcting for the 
cycle not only total expenditure,  but also its components. 
Indeed, there are economic as well as statistical  reasons to question 
whether  the balance of tax increases and spending  cuts, and the com- 
position of the latter, are in fact the dominant  determinants  of a deficit 
reduction  being expansionary  or contractionary.  An alternative  hypoth- 
esis is that the macroeconomic  effects hinge on initial conditions. The Alberto  Alesina, Roberto  Perotti, and Jose Tavares  257 
effect of fiscal consolidation on consumer confidence and consumer 
spending  is likely to resemble the effect of speed on passengers'  peace 
of mind in a moving car. If the car is hurtling toward a brick wall, 
stepping on the brakes  will increase the confidence of the passengers. 
Likewise, if fiscal policy is on an unsustainable  trajectory,  with explo- 
sive growth in the ratio of debt to GNP, stepping on the budgetary 
brakes will increase confidence, encourage consumer spending, and 
stimulate investment, because households and firms believe that ad- 
justment today will obviate the need for more painful and costly ad- 
justment  tomorrow.  But if the car is creeping  along an empty highway, 
the passengers will begin to wonder whether they are ever going to 
reach  their destination;  if the driver  steps on the brakes,  the passengers 
will throw up their hands in despair. And when there is no problem  of 
fiscal sustainability, spending cuts or tax increases are more likely to 
elicit the standard  textbook response. 
Thus by focusing on large budget cuts, persistent  budget cuts, and 
budget  cuts dominated  by transfers  and the public sector wage bill, the 
authors  overlook the principal determinant  of whether those cuts are 
expansionary  or contractionary,  namely, the initial conditions, and in 
particular,  whether  fiscal policy is on a sustainable  course or not. One 
would  expect budget  cuts of the same  size, persistence,  and  composition 
to have very different effects, depending on the initial debt-to-GNP 
ratio, the growth  rate of the economy, and the real interest  rate. I have 
already  mentioned  why the evidence from Ireland  and Denmark  in the 
1980s is difficult  to interpret,  but for those who believe that  these fiscal 
consolidations  were expansionary,  it is precisely the fact that the ratio 
of debt to GDP was exploding in these countries  that  lends credence  to 
the argument. 
Figure  B I puts together  the points discussed above, where the hori- 
zontal  axis represents  GNP and  the vertical  axis represesents  the deficit. 
The downward-sloping  curve is the response of the deficit to GNP; I 
label it the revenue effect (although  there may also be some induced 
reduction  in deficit spending  with growth,  due to lower outlays  on, inter 
alia, unemployment  compensation).  The other curve, which slopes up 
but bends back when deficits reach sufficiently high levels, represents 
the direct effect of deficit spending  on GNP. I label this the multiplier 
effect,  with the understanding  that the multiplier can be positive or 
negative. One thus has a "Keynesian" range of  small deficits and 258  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1998 
Figure  B-1. Interaction  between Fiscal Policy and Output 
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"non-Keynesian" range  of large deficits. There  are  two equilibria,  and 
only the low-deficit equilibrium  is stable. If revenues  respond  to output 
with a lag and the economy is always on the multiplier  curve, then a 
small perturbation  in the neighborhood  of the low-deficit equilibrium 
will have only a small output  effect; but an equally small perturbation 
in the neighborhood  of the high-deficit equilibrium  can have a very 
large output  effect. Accordingly, it is not just the composition, size, or 
persistence of the deficit cut that matters,  but the initial conditions. 
There  is reason  to think  that  initial conditions  also determine  whether 
deficit reductions through spending cuts have more favorable output 
effects than do deficit reductions  through  tax increases. To be sure, in 
Northern  Europe, where the initial condition  is a bloated  public sector, 
a fiscal consolidation that emphasizes spending cuts is very likely to 
have favorable  output  effects. But in Russia, to take an extreme coun- 
terexample, the initial condition is deficits due to tax avoidance and 
unsatisfactory  revenue performance  generally. In this case, fiscal con- 
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than attempting  further  cuts in the social safety net. Most countries  lie 
between these extremes, but precisely where is not clear. 
Note that table 5, in which the authors  analyze the correlation  be- 
tween successful and unsuccessful adjustments  and initial conditions 
(in the form of the level of and accumulated  change in the public debt 
ratio), is consistent with this emphasis. This table shows that govern- 
ments  are  more  likely to implement  sustained  fiscal consolidations  when 
initial conditions are poor. Since the authors show elsewhere in the 
paper  that successful adjustments  are more likely to be expansionary, 
one can infer that  fiscal adjustments  undertaken  when initial conditions 
are poor have the most positive macroeconomic  effects, although  this 
point is not analyzed  explicitly. Nor do the authors  take  the critical  final 
step of asking whether  the mix of tax increases and spending  cuts, and 
the composition of the latter, still significantly shape the macroeco- 
nomic response after controlling  for those initial conditions. 
The authors'  new results on the political consequences of fiscal ad- 
justments  are  especially interesting.  They find  that  looser fiscal policies 
do not increase a government's  chances of political survival, and that 
cuts in the public sector wage bill and in transfer  payments do not 
increase the chances of government  collapse. This poses a paradox:  if 
fiscal consolidation is rewarded, or at least if  governments are not 
penalized for it, why then are they so reluctant  to undertake  it? The 
authors  suggest that  transfer  recipients  and  public  employees, spending 
on whom must be cut if the fiscal consolidation is to be sustainable, 
comprise a formidable  blocking coalition. 
The zero coefficient on the deficit on which this conclusion hinges 
is an example  of the Frankel  recipe  for success: "The secret  of empirical 
work  is to define  your  hypothesis  so that  failure  to find  significant  results 
can be interpreted  as support.'"'  In particular,  I worry that this zero 
coefficient is a product  of multicolinearity.  According to the authors' 
own arguments,  minority  coalition governments  will find it difficult to 
engineer sustained  reductions  in deficit spending, because they are un- 
able to form the kind of encompassing coalitions needed to achieve 
agreement  on sacrifices  all around.  But one also knows, from the elec- 
toral politics literature,  that political fragmentation-good proxies for 
which are coalition status, the number  of parties in the coalition, and 
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majority  or minority status in the parliament-is  the most robust pre- 
dictor of government  tenure. These variables affect cabinet changes 
directly but also affect the change in the deficit, so that the effect of 
the latter  on cabinet changes is likely to be difficult to pin down. 
Hence I am more impressed  by the regressions  in which the authors 
attempt to distinguish the effects of large deficit cuts and of  fiscal 
consolidations that mainly take the form of spending cuts on political 
popularity  and  government  survival. Again, however, the troubling  fact 
is that  most of the relevant  coefficients  are  insignificantly  different  from 
zero. In any case, if one believes that rather  than the magnitude  or the 
composition of the change in the deficit, it is initial conditions  that are 
important,  it is not entirely clear what to make of these results. 
Reverse causality is an issue here as well,  and the authors go to 
considerable  lengths to address  it. They look at the timing of changes 
in government  and  fiscal  policy, experiment  with instruments,  and  focus 
on a subset of exogenously imposed changes in fiscal stance associated 
with the requirements  of the Maastricht  treaty, asking whether  the re- 
sponse to these is any different. Let me comment  on the last. Assume 
that fiscal consolidation  really does reduce government  popularity,  but 
ordinary  least squares  regressions  fail to pick this up because  unusually 
popular  governments  use their surplus  political capital to reduce defi- 
cits. Because Maastricht-mandated  reductions  are exogenous (ignoring 
Pogo's problem, "I have met the signatories  of the Maastricht  treaty, 
and  they are  us"), reverse  causality  is less of a problem,  and  one should 
expect a negative  effect of deficit  reduction.  But a Maastricht-mandated 
deficit reduction  yields not only a different  fiscal position but also the 
reward  of qualifying for monetary  union, which one presumes would 
have a positive effect on popular  support  for the government,  especially 
in countries  like Italy, where  deficit  reduction  is a pressing  issue. Given 
this unique payoff structure,  it is not surprising  that the authors  again 
fail to find a negative impact of deficit cuts on government  popularity. 
General discussion: Alan Blinder thought  that the paper did not pay 
sufficient attention  to the endogenous response of monetary  policy to 
fiscal contractions  that  may partially  offset their effect. Robert  Gordon 
and James Duesenberry  agreed with Blinder, arguing that it was im- 
portant  to take into account  the entire policy package, which might be 
designed to offset fiscal contraction  with expansionary  monetary  policy Alberto  Alesina, Roberto  Perotti, and Jose Tavares  261 
or devaluation. For example, Gordon suspected that in the case of 
countries that left the European  Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1992, 
the contractionary  effect of fiscal retrenchment  may have been at least 
partly  offset by the expansionary  effects of devaluations.  He also sug- 
gested that  governments  tend  to pursue  fiscal consolidation  during  times 
of robust  GDP growth  and thought  that  the paper  did not pay sufficient 
attention to the possibility that initial conditions were driving their 
results. 
In the same vein, David Laibson  remarked  that  the average  popular- 
ity of governments  that engaged in fiscal adjustments  did not convey 
enough information  about  the circumstances  under  which governments 
carried  out reform. Popularity  may give a government  the opportunity 
to make a difficult adjustment,  but governments in crisis, with low 
popularity,  may also find the pressure  for reform  to be great. He sug- 
gested that it would be interesting  to see the full distribution  of popu- 
larity  for governments  that  undertook  reform. Laibson  also pointed  out 
that it may be difficult to generalize the authors' conclusions from 
reactions to adjustments  imposed by the Maastricht  criteria  to adjust- 
ments  under  circumstances  in which a government  acted at its own will. 
Richard  Cooper was skeptical of the authors'  results. He noted that 
in France and Germany, despite long ongoing debates, governments 
had not succeeded in controlling their expenditures.  Either  politicians 
did not understand  the business  they were in-a  conclusion  at odds with 
the usual omniscience and rationality  postulates in modern  economic 
theory-or  there were important  factors present  in the real world that 
the authors  had omitted. Blinder queried  the authors'  view that politi- 
cians find it easier to raise taxes than to reduce government  spending. 
He did not believe this true for "Anglo"  countries. Frank Stafford 
suggested that fiscal adjustments  were more likely to receive popular 
support  when they were associated with reforms of transfer  systems 
that are perceived as unfair. 
Christopher  Sims suggested that the right conclusion to draw from 
the authors'  results is that it is hard  to tell from these data whether  or 
not deficits matter to political outcomes. There is a strong negative 
simple correlation  of deficit changes with changes in government,  and 
a positive simple correlation  between  changes in deficit and  popularity. 
Not surprisingly,  when lots of other cyclical variables  are included in 
the authors'  regression  framework,  almost  everything  appears  insignif- 262  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1998 
icant. There is just not enough independent  variation  among the varia- 
bles to sort out their individual  importance. 
Benjamin  Friedman  expressed concern  about  the short  horizon  used 
in the definition  of "successful" adjustments,  on the ground  that some 
adjustments  may at first appear  to be successful, only to unravel  after 
just a few years. He also suggested investigating  whether  the political 
ramifications  of successful consolidations  were different  from those of 
unsuccessful ones. Alberto  Alesina, Roberto  Perotti, and Jose'  Tavares  263 
References 
Alesina, Alberto, and Silvia Ardagna. 1998. "Tales of Fiscal Adjustments." 
Economic  Policy  (forthcoming). 
Alesina, Alberto,  and  Allan Drazen. 1991. "Why are  Stabilizations  Delayed?" 
American Economic Review 81(5):  1170-88. 
Alesina, Alberto, and Roberto  Perotti. 1995. "Fiscal Expansions  and Adjust- 
ments in OECD Countries."  Economic Policy  21: 205-48 
. 1996.  "Reducing  Budget Deficits."  Swedish Economic Policy Review 
3(1): 113-34. 
.  1997a. "Fiscal Adjustments  in OECD Countries:  Composition  and 
Macroeconomic  Effects."  International Monetary Fund Staff Papers  44(2): 
210-48. 
.  1997b. "The Welfare State and Competitiveness." American  Eco- 
nomic Review 87(5):  921-39. 
Alesina, Alberto, Alessandro  Prati, and Guido Tabellini. 1990. "Public Con- 
fidence and Debt Management:  A Model and a Case Study of Italy." In 
Public Debt Management: Theory and History,  edited by Rudiger Dornbusch 
and Mario  Draghi. Cambridge  University  Press. 
Alesina, Alberto, and Howard Rosenthal. 1995. Partisan Politics, Divided 
Government, and the Economy.  Cambridge University  Press. 
Alesina, Alberto, Nouriel Roubini, and Gerald D.  Cohen. 1997. Political 
Cycles and the Macroeconomy.  MIT Press. 
Alesina, Alberto, and others. 1992. "Default Risk on Government  Debt in 
OECD Countries."  Economic  Policy  15: 427-63. 
Banks,  Arthur S.,  and others,  eds.  1996.  Political  Handbook  of the  World: 
1995-1996.  Binghampton,  N.Y.: CSA Publications. 
Baxter, Marianne,  and  Robert  G. King. 1993. "Fiscal Policy in General  Equi- 
librium."  American Economic Review 83(3):  315-34. 
Bertola, Giuseppe, and  Allan Drazen. 1993. "Trigger  Points and  Budget  Cuts: 
Explaining the Effects of Fiscal Austerity." American Economic Review 
83(1): 11-26. 
Blanchard,  Olivier Jean. 1990a. "Comment." In NBER  Macroeconomics  An- 
nual 1990, edited  by Olivier  Jean  Blanchard  and  Stanley  Fischer.  MIT  Press. 
. 1990b. "Suggestions for a New Set of Fiscal Indicators." Working 
Paper  79. Paris:  Organisation  for Economic Co-operation  and Development 
(April). 
Budge, Ian, Hans Keman, and  Jaap  Woldendorp.  1993. "Political Data 1945- 
90."  European Journal  of Political  Research  24(1):  1-120. 
Calvo, Guillermo  A.  1988. "Servicing the Public Debt: The Role of Expec- 
tations."  American Economic Review 78(4):  647-61. 264  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1998 
Cukierman,  Alex, and Mariano  Tommasi. 1998. "When Does It Take a Nixon 
to Go to China?" American Economic Review 88(1):  180-97. 
European Commission.  1998.  Convergence Report 1998.  Brussels. 
Fair, Ray C. 1978. "The Effect of Economic  Events on Votes for President." 
Review of Economics  and Statistics  60(2):  159-73. 
Friedman, Benjamin M.  1978.  "Crowding Out or Crowding  In? Economic 
Consequences of Financing Government  Deficits." BPEA, 3:1978,  593- 
654. 
Gavin, Michael, and  Roberto  Perotti. 1997. "Fiscal Policy in Latin  America." 
In NBER Macroeconomics  Annual  1997,  edited  by  Ben  S.  Bernanke  and 
Julio Rotemberg.  MIT Press. 
Giavazzi, Francesco, and Marco Pagano. 1990. "Can Severe Fiscal Adjust- 
ment  Be Expansionary?  Tales of Two Small European  Countries."  In NBER 
Macroeconomics  Annual  1990, edited  by Olivier  Jean  Blanchard  and  Stanley 
Fischer. MIT Press. 
. 1996. "Non-Keynesian  Effects of Fiscal Policy Changes:  International 
Evidence  and the Swedish  Experience."  Swedish Economic  Policy  Review 
3(1): 67-103. 
Grilli, Vittorio, Donato Masciandaro,  and Guido Tabellini. 1991. "Political 
and Monetary  Institutions  and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial 
Countries."  Economic Policy  6: 341-92. 
Hallerberg,  Mark, and Jiirgen  von Hagen. 1997. "Electoral  Institutions,  Cab- 
inet Negotiations, and the Budget Deficits within the European  Union." 
Discussion Paper 1555. London:  Centre  for Economic  Policy Research. 
Hubbard,  R. Glenn, and  Kenneth  L. Judd. 1986. "Liquidity  Constraints,  Fiscal 
Policy, and Consumption."  BPEA, 1:1986, 1-60. 
International  Monetary  Fund. 1996. World  Economic  Outlook.  Washington. 
Kontopoulos,  Yanos, and  Roberto  Perotti. 1997. "Fragmented  Fiscal Policy." 
Unpublished  paper. Columbia  University. 
Kraemer,  Moritz. 1997. "Electoral Budget Cycles in Latin America and the 
Caribbean:  Incidence, Causes, and Political Futility." Working  Paper  354. 
Washington:  Inter-American  Development  Bank. 
Kramer,  Gerald  H. 1971. "Short-Term  Fluctuations  in U.S. Voting Behavior, 
1896-64."  American Political  Science  Review 65(1):  131-43. 
Krugman,  Paul. 1996. "Are Currency  Crises Self-Fulfilling?"  In NBER  Mac- 
roeconomics  Annual 1996, edited by Ben S. Bernanke  and Julio J. Rotem- 
berg. MIT Press. 
Lewis-Beck, Michael S. 1988. Elections and the Economy.  Oxford  University 
Press. 
Lowry, Robert, James Alt, and Karen  Ferre. 1997. "Fiscal Policy Outcomes 
and Electoral  Accountability." Unpublished  paper.  Harvard  University. 
McDermott,  C. John, and Robert  F. Wescott. 1996. "An Empirical  Analysis Alberto  Alesina, Roberto  Perotti, and Jose'  Tavares  265 
of  Fiscal  Adjustments."  International  Monetary Fund  Staff Papers  43(4): 
725-53. 
Miller, Marcus  H., Robert  Skidelsky, and  Paul  Weller. 1990. "Fear of Deficit 
Financing-Is  It Rational?"  In Public  Debt Management:  Theory and His- 
tory, edited  by Rudiger  Dornbusch  and  Mario  Draghi.  Cambridge  University 
Press. 
Nordhaus,  William D. 1975. "The Political Business Cycle." Review  of Eco- 
nomic Studies 42(2):  169-90. 
Obstfeld, Maurice. 1997. "Europe's  Gamble." BPEA, 2:1997, 241-317. 
Paldam, Martin. 1991. "How Robust  Is the Vote Function?  A Study of Sev- 
enteen  Nations  over  Four Decades."  In Economics  and Politics:  The Cal- 
culus of Support, edited by Helmut Norpoth, Michael S. Lewis-Beck, and 
Jean-Dominique  Lafay. University  of Michigan  Press. 
Peltzman, Sam. 1992. "Voters as Fiscal Conservatives." Quarterly  Journal 
of Economics  107(2):  327-61. 
Pencavel, John  H. 1986. "Labor  Supply  of Men: A Survey." In Handbook  of 
Labor  Economics, vol. 1, edited by Orley Ashenfelter  and Richard  Layard. 
Amsterdam:  North  Holland. 
Perotti, Roberto. 1997. "Fiscal Policy When Things Are Going Badly." Un- 
published  paper.  Columbia  University  (October). 
Perry,  George L. 1975. "Policy Alternatives  for 1974." BPEA, 1:1975, 222- 
35. 
Persson,  Torsten,  and  Lars  E. 0.  Svensson. 1989. "Why a Stubborn  Conserv- 
ative Would Run a Deficit: Policy with Time-Inconsistent  Preferences." 
Quarterly Journal of Economics  104(2):  325-45. 
Powell, G. Bingham  Jr., and  Guy D. Whitten. 1993. "A Cross-National  Anal- 
ysis of Economic Voting: Taking  Account of the Political Context." Amer- 
ican Journal  of Political  Science  37(2):  391-414. 
Rogoff, Kenneth. 1990.  "Equilibrium  Political Budget Cycles."  American 
Economic Review 80(1):  21-36. 
Shiller, Robert  J. 1996. "Why Do People Dislike Inflation?"  Working  Paper 
5539. Cambridge,  Mass.: National  Bureau  of Economic  Research  (April). 
Spolaore, Enrico. 1993. "Policy-Making  Systems and Economic Efficiency: 
Coalition Governments  vs.  Majority Governments." Unpublished  paper. 
Harvard  University. 
Strom,  Kaare,  and Martin  Lipset. 1984. "Macroeconomics  and  Macropolitics: 
The Electoral Performance of  Democratic Government." Unpublished 
paper. 
Summers,  Lawrence  H., and Olivier Jean Blanchard. 1990. "Hysteresis and 
the European Unemployment  Problem."  In Understanding  Unemployment, 
edited  by Lawrence  H. Summers.  MIT Press. 
Sutherland,  Alan.  1997.  "Fiscal Crises and Aggregate Demand: Can High 266  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1998 
Public Debt Reverse the Effects of Fiscal Policy?" Journal of Public Eco- 
nomics 65(2):  147-62. 
Tabellini, Guido, and  Alberto  Alesina. 1990. "Voting on the Budget  Deficit." 
American Economic Review 80(1):  37-49. 
Tavares, Jose. 1998. "Does Right or Left Matter?  Cabinets, Credibility  and 
Fiscal Adjustments."  Unpublished  paper. Harvard  University  (May). 
Teeters, Nancy H. 1972. "Outlook  for Federal  Fiscal Policy." BPEA, 2:1972, 
467-77. 
Velasco, Andres. 1996. "A Model of Fiscal Deficits and Delayed Fiscal Re- 
forms." Unpublished  paper.  New York University. 